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CHALLENGING THE ROOTS OF THE
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS: THE OCC 'S
OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES REGULATIONS
AND WATTERS V. WACHOVIA BANK
WookBai Kim
in 2007, the Supreme Court in Watters v. Wachovia Bank finally sided
with the OCC's preemption of state consumer protection laws which had
policed operating subsidiaries of national banks. In drawing this
conclusion, the OCC's unchallenged interpretations of the incidental
powers of the NBA-the argument that "the national bank has incidental
power to conduct business through operating subsidiaries"--played a
determinative role, effectively rendering those subsidiaries subject to the
exclusive regulation of the OCC. However, this paper argues that the OCC's
construction is contrary to law and is unreasonable given the plain
language of the NBA, precedential case law and the structure of the NBA.
The OCC's arguments only reflect its self-interest to be "an umbrella bank
regulator"of the operatingsubsidiary, a state-charteredcorporation.
To rethink debates concerning the regulatory jurisdiction over
operating subsidiaries has significant implications. Operatingsubsidiaries
which engage in originating subprime mortgages have created serious
allegations of abusive lending practices. In particular,the preemption of
state laws over operating subsidiaries since 2ooi has deteriorated
consumer protection in the subprime mortgage market, which is, to a
substantial degree, responsible for the subprime mortgage crisis. The
immunization of operating subsidiaries of national banks from stringent
state consumer protection laws has been used to spread the agenda of
deregulationover the entire sub-prime mortgage marketfor the past several
years.
I. INTRODUCTION

S

everal years'
worth of controversy concerning
regulatory
jurisdiction over national bank operating subsidiaries was settled in
the' decision of the Supreme Court in Watters v. Wachovia Bank' in
April 2007. The Court affirmed the 2001 interpretation of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")2 that the National Bank Act
("NBA") and the OCC's regulations preempt state consumer protection
laws which had policed national bank operating subsidiaries. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the State of Michigan's argument that
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") is a primary federal bank regulator
for national banks.
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mortgage-lending subsidiaries were "subject to multistate control" in
addition to the OCC's regulatory authority,3 noting that the Court had
"treated operating subsidiaries as equivalent to national banks with
respect to powers exercised under federal law."
As a bank policy, the OCC's preemption in 2001 has had
significant implications. It has had a crippling impact on consumer
protection because the state was prohibited from' policing activities of
operating subsidiaries which produce serious abusive lending practices
in the subprime mortgage market. Furthermore, this preemption,
combined with the OCC's subsequent preemption measures and state
parity laws, deteriorates the level of consumer protection, which is
strongly associated with the recent subprime mortgage crisis.
Ostensibly, the OCC's preemption seems to have impacted the national
bank and its operating subsidiaries, but the immunization from strong
state consumer protection laws has extended beyond the national bank
to the entire field of subprime mortgages.
Recognizing the close connection between the OCC's
preemption and the subprime mortgage crisis, this paper critically
approaches the OCC's preemption in 2ooi and concludes that the
OCC's construction is contrary to law and unreasonable. In drawing
this conclusion, this paper challenges the incidental power to use an
operating subsidiary and the OCC's superintendence of operating
subsidiaries for the first time. The OCC's interpretation of incidental
powers in the NBA that "the national bank has incidental power to
conduct business through operating subsidiaries" played a central role
in justifying preemption. The Supreme Court in Watters repeatedly
emphasized that Michigan did not dispute the national bank's
incidental power to use operating subsidiaries and the OCC's authority
to regulate operating subsidiaries in the same manner as national
banks.6
However, examining the limitations of incidental powers in
light of the plain language of 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) ("§ 24(7)") and the
regulatory structure of the NBA demonstrates: (i) that the incidental
power to use an operating subsidiary exceeds the OCC's interpretive
authority under § 24(7); (ii) the OCC is not generally empowered to
regulate an operating subsidiary pursuant to § 24(7), "consolidated
supervision," and section i21 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLBA").7 Consistent with the NBA, the Court should limit the
Watters,

127

S. Ct. at

1571-72.

Id. at 1570-71.
Applicability of State Law to National Bank Operating Subsidiaries, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4oo6.
(2008).

See infra notes 88, 116 and accompanying text.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"), § 121(a)(2), 113 Stat. 1378 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
24a(g)(3)(A)) [hereinafter "§ 24a(gX3)(A)"].
6
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national bank's incidental power to the ability to "own and control"
operating subsidiaries and the OCC's regulatory authority to the
oversight of the national bank's conduct as a shareholder of its
subsidiaries.8
Part II briefly explains that the OCC's preemption has
contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. Part III.A shows how the
OCC's construction of incidental powers conflicts with state laws. Part
III.B and III.C analyze the OCC's regulatory scheme for operating
subsidiaries, including their creation and justifications, together with
the Supreme Court's decision in Watters. Part IV challenges the
undisputed concept of incidental power in Watters. Part IV.A shows
that key justifications for the OCC's assertion of preemption create
impermissible constructions of incidental powers. Part IV.B finds
limitations on incidental powers from the plain language of § 24(7). Part
IV.C shows that the OCC is not authorized to exclusively regulate
operating subsidiaries under the regulatory framework of the NBA.
Finally, Part V provides concluding remarks.

II. REGULATIONS FOR OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES AND THE SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS

A. NationalBanks' Involvement in the Subprime Mortgage Market and
PredatoryLending, and States' Efforts to Protect Consumers
From the late 199os, a radical growth of the subprime mortgage
market drove national banks to engage in the secondary market.9
Usually the banks' operating subsidiaries and affiliates have originated
subprime mortgage loans,1" and the banks themselves have purchased,
securitized, and sold those securitized loans in the capital market."
Many banks could make huge profits in this risky business, while
See Discussion infra Part IV.
See generally Evan M. Gilreath, Note, The Entrance of Banks into Subprime Lending:
First Union and the Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149 (i999) (explaining that "one of the

most important changes is the increased participation of banks in the subprime mortgage
market'); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. FinancialServices
Industry, 1975-2000. Competition, Consolidation,and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
393 (explaining that "by early 2o0o, big banks controlled eight of the ten largest subprime
mortgage companies" and further stating that "Citigroup became the biggest subprime mortgage
consumer lenders" in 2000).
" In fact, most national bank operating subsidiaries participate in the subprime mortgage
business. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: PredatoryLending,
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1342, 1369-70 (2006)

[hereinafter "American Dream"]. As of the end of 2007, 348 national bank operating subsidiaries
transacted directly with consumers for a majority of the mortgage lending business. See OCC,
National Bank Subsidiaries Doing Business with Consumers (Dec. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/consumer/ OperatingSubsidiaries.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
" See, e.g., American Dream, supra note so, at 1349-50 (describing how banks can profit in
the process of securitization of subprime mortgage loans).
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dispersing high risks to investors through the securitization of subprime
mortgages. 12
The reason for banks to use operating subsidiaries is to
circumvent various risks which might occur when the bank itself
originates subprime mortgages-for example, the deterioration of the
bank's safety and soundness, litigation risks and reputational damage.
In addition, there are regulatory advantages when the bank utilizes its
operating subsidiaries. First, the most significant advantage of the
parent-subsidiary structure is to insulate the parent bank from the
liability of the riskier business of the subsidiary because the subsidiary
has a separate legal status under state corporate laws. 13 Second, the
limited liability also helps banks avoid legal risks from much litigation
claiming that they are engaged in predatory lending practices. Third,
banks can minimize reputational threats by conducting subprime
mortgage business through their operating subsidiaries. In particular, to
originate loans without reviewing borrowers' repayment ability and
then to foreclose their houses may significantly damage the banks'
reputation, 4 exposing banks to litigations, financial loss, or a decline in
their customer base. 5 Another significant advantage is the avoidance of
bank regulations. 6 The operating subsidiary in itself, as a non-bank
mortgage company, is not subject to the safety and soundness
regulations, such as the capital requirements applicable to the parent
bank." Also, §§ 23 A and 24 B of the Federal Reserve Act, which govern
transactions between a bank and its affiliates, do not apply to the
bank's transactions with its operating subsidiaries." Thus, for instance,
"2See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. & U.S. Dep't of Treasuiry, Curbing Predatory
Home Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report at 45 (200o), available at http://huduser.org/publications/
hsgfin/curbing.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (explaining that banks and thrifts increased their
profits in the subprime mortgage market). In particular, the securitization of subprime mortgage
loans offered preferable conditions for lenders, such as lower funding costs and dispersion of credit
risks. In addition, higher interest rates on subprime mortgage loans maintained higher interest
spreads, guaranteeing greater profits. See American Dream, supra note io,at 1326-2 7.
15 See infra notes io5-io6 and accompanying text.
" See OCC Advisory Letter AL 2003-3, Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices
in Brokered and Purchased Loans at 5 (Feb. 2 1, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
advisory/2oo 3 -3.pdf (stating that lenders' reckless underwriting may face significant reputation
risk at the time of home foreclosure).
i" See OCC, MORTGAGE BANKING: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK at 5-6 (Mar. 1998),

available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/mortgage.pdf.
16 See U.S. Gen. Accounting. Office, OCC Preemption Rules: OCC Should Further Clarify
the Applicability of State Consumer ProtectionLaws to NationalBanks 24 n.30 (2oo6), availableat
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do6387.pdf [hereinafter "GAO Report"] (citing the OCC's
statement that using an operating subsidiary has advantages in "transactions with affiliates,
regulatory capital requirements, and accounting considerations").
11 Even though the OCC regulates national banks and their operating subsidiaries on a
consolidated basis, subsidiaries themselves are not subject to the OCC's prudential regulations,
such as minimum capital requirements. See infra notes 258-2 72 and accompanying text.
s i2 U.S.C. §§ 371c(bX2)(A) and 371c-1; See also JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P.
MILLER & RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 475-76 (3d ed. 2001)

(explaining that section 23A does not apply to the bank's transactions with subsidiaries and
section 23B is applied when banks and their subsidiaries transact business with affiliates).
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banks can make transactions with their operating subsidiaries without
the application of the percentage-of-capital limitations19 and dealing
with affiliates at arm's length. 2° This statutory exemption permits
subsidiaries to obtain unlimited funds from parent banks on terms and
conditions favorable to the operating subsidiaries.2 ' In short, national
banks can utilize their operating subsidiaries under regulatory
forbearance, which facilitates the subprime mortgage business, while
parent banks entertain limited legal liability and minimized criticism
for conducting subprime mortgage business.
Stiff competition among subprime mortgage lenders resulted in
loosening mortgage underwriting criteria which has caused a
proliferation of predatory lending practices.2 In response, in the early
2000S,
state governments vigorously investigated consumers'
complaints and enforced their current laws23 as well as enhancing
predatory lending acts, such as the Georgia Fair Lending Act ("GFLA")
of 2002.24 Such state efforts included conducting investigations and
bringing enforcement against the national bank's operating subsidiaries
and affiliates.25 For example, in late 2002 California attempted to
enforce its real estate mortgage laws against Wells Forgo Home
Mortgage, Inc. and National City Mortgage Co. which were operating
subsidiaries of Wells Fargo National Bank and National City Bank of
Indiana, respectively. 26 The year before, North Carolina forced
1912 U.S.C. §

3 71c(a);(b).

A bank's covered transactions-such as extension of credit and

purchasing assets-with one affiliate and all affiliates cannot exceed io% and 20% of the bank's
capital respectively. Also, covered transactions must be fully secured by qualifying collateral and
basically the bank cannot purchase low-quality asset from affiliates. See generally MACEY ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 472-75.
20 12 U.S.C. § 371c-s(a)() (providing that a bank and its subsidiaries must transact business
with affiliates on market terms).
2" This exception implies that benefits of governmental subsidies toward the national bank
spill over to its operating subsidiaries unrestrictedly in conducting the subprime mortgages
business in light of the funding and sale of subprime mortgages. See American Dream, supra note
io, at 1352-53. Notably, these regulatory advantages also offer parent banks an incentive to
conceal their financial loss by transferring their subsidiaries' good assets to themselves while

leaving bad assets in the subsidiaries, which will increase the losses of the subsidiaries' outside
creditors. When the market condition is in distress and banks' losses are imminent, this scenario
can occur by transactions between banks and their subsidiaries.
" The term of "predatory lending" is frequently defined by reference to a variety of lending
practices, fundamentally characterized as aggressive marketing of credit to blemished borrowers
without regard to the ability to repay and predominantly relying on the liquidation value of the
collateral. See OCC-Advisory Letter AL 2003-3, supra note 14.
23 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 314-15 (2004) (explaining that during 2003, states performed more
than 20,000 investigations of abusive lending practices and conducted more that 40oo enforcement
actions).
24 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-I (2004). See also infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
21 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, at 314-15; American Dream, supra note so, at
1349-50.

16 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F-3 d 949 (9th Cir. 2005); Brief of
National City Bank as Amicus Curiae In Support of Respondents, at 16-i9, Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342).
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Associate First Capital, a non-bank affiliate of Citigroup, to pay 20
million dollars to settle allegations of predatory lending practices.27 In
addition, large national banks-for example, Bank of America,
Citibank, Bank One, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo-and their
operating subsidiaries or affiliates were involved in suits charging
predatory lending practices.28
The burdensome state litigations were, however, recognized as
significant obstacles to the subprime mortgage business of the national
banks. The banking industry wanted to avoid the states' intervention,
which also coincided with the OCC's aim to be the sole regulator of the
national banks.29
B. Aggressive Preemptionand the Impact on the Subprime Mortgage
Market
i. Preemptive Regulation for Operating Subsidiaries and Subsequent
Preemption
In 2001, the OCC construed the NBA and the OCC's
regulations as preempting state consumer protection laws which had
policed national bank operating subsidiaries for more than 30 years.30
By treating operating subsidiaries as "the equivalent of departments or
divisions of their parent banks," the OCC claimed that state laws were
applicable to operating subsidiaries "only to the extent that they are
applied to national banks."31 Relying on this construction, national
"' See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting off More Than They Can Chew?, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 515, 522 (2007) (explaining that North Carolina drove Citigroup to reach
settlement on predatory lending). In 2oo2, Citigroup also agreed to pay $240 million to settle
predatory claims filed by the FTC and customers against Associates First Capital. See Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, at 314-15; American Dream, supra note io,at I304-o6.
28 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, at 315; NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
COMMENTS OF THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CONSUMER ADVOCATES, AND U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP TO OFFICE OF

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,

OCC DOCKET NO. 03-16,

BANKING ACTIVITIES AND
6, 2003), available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/preemption/content/io6_occ-content.html
[hereinafter
"NCLC COMMENTS"] (illustrating 23 cases against national banks and their operating subsidiaries
or affiliates which were involved in illegal or predatory lending).
29 See Arthur E.Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, at 236. In spring 2003, the OCC was concerned
with states' efforts to regulate mortgage lending by national bank operating subsidiaries because it
would add regulatory costs and lead to litigations such as the case in California. See OCC News
Release NR 2003-3o, Remarks by John D. Hawke, Jr. Comptroller of the Currency Before the
Exchequer Club Washington, D.C (April i6, 2003); OCC News Release NR 2003-36, Chief
Counsel Julie L. Williams Provides Historical Perspective On Issues Facing the National Banking
OPERATIONS;

REAL

ESTATE

LENDING

AND

APPRAISALS

(Oct.

System (May 14, 2003).
30 i2 C.F.R. § 7.4oo6 (providing that "[s]tate laws apply to national bank operating

subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank').
"' Investment Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784,
34,788 (July 2, 2oo1) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4oo6).
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bank operating subsidiaries refused to comply with state laws requiring
registration, paying fees, and filing financial reports, or cooperate with
state investigations and examinations over consumer complaints.3 2
In 2003 the OCC determined that the NBA preempts Georgia's
predatory lending law, the GFLA,33 the strongest state law aimed to
curb predatory lending practices. 34 The act included restrictions or
prohibitions on predatory lending practices such as refinancing,
prepayment penalties, balloon payments and loans made without
regard to the borrower's ability to repay. Also, in order to impede
flows of capital to unscrupulous mortgage lenders, the act imposed
strict assignee liability on investors of securitized subprime mortgages
when the underlying loans were deemed predatory loans. 6 However,
the OCC concluded that a national bank is not subject to many
provisions of the GFLA because they limit, condition, or otherwise
impermissibly affect a national bank's real estate lending. " The
operating subsidiaries could'avoid the application of the GFLA given
the 2001 preemptive regulation which immunizes operating subsidiaries
from state visitorial powers.3
Finally, the OCC in January 2004 promulgated two regulations
to broaden its preemption purview-the bank activities rule and the
visitorial powers rule ("Preemption Regulations").39 The Preemption
Regulations were prompted by states' intensified efforts to intervene in
the subprime mortgage lending business.40 These regulations provide
sweeping authority to preempt state laws if they "obstruct, impair, or
condition" a national bank's ability to engage in real estate lending and
other lending; thus, a state law governs only when it incidentally affects
the national bank's business. 4 ' At the same time, these regulations make
clear that the OCC exclusively enforces state laws that govern the
content and conduct of the banking activities of the national banks,

" See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
13OCC, Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003).
31See American Dream, supra note io, at 1320 (explaining that "the statute, in its original
form, was the strongest in the nation").
35GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-2 to 5.
36 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (providing that the assignee of a high-cost loan "shall be subject

to all affirmative claims and any defense with respect to the loan that the borrower could assert
against the original creditor...").
310CC, Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,264.
3s Id. at 46,28o-81.

31OCC, Bank Activities and Operations: Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34); Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000).

40 Preemption Regulations were proposed by the OCC in Aug. 2003 when the OCC
preempted the GFLA. See Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and

Federal Banking Agency Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BuS. LAW. 1193, 1203-04 (20o4)

(stating that Preemption Regulations were proposed to "specify the types of restrictions and
requirements applicable to any real estate lending activities by national banks").
41 Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1904.
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regardless of whether the laws are preempted or not. With respect to
operating subsidiaries, the OCC, on the assumption of the 2001
preemptive regulation, construed the Preemption Regulations to govern
the activities of national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent
as that of their parent banks."Accordingly, the states' ability to enforce
their consumer protection laws was effectively eliminated and, in fact, a
regime of de facto "field preemption" of the states' regulatory power has
been created."
2.

Strong Association With the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

While a series of OCC preemptions have facilitated the
operating subsidiaries' subprime mortgage activities, opponents of
those preemptions, such as state governments, consumer groups and
many scholars, have consistently criticized them as being inconsistent
with Congress' intent under the NBA and as undermining state efforts
to combat predatory lending.45 They have argued that state consumer
protection laws should not be preempted because states have strong
local interests to protect consumers and, in fact, have enacted stringent
consumer protection laws. and enforced them vigorously. 46
Commentators further argued that the OCC is not a consumer
protection agency,. but, rather, is responsible for the safety and
.soundness of national banks,47 so that it has no motivation to take
strong measures to enhance consumer protection.48 The OCC has, in
fact, adopted lax predatory lending standards and has not strictly
investigated or enforced such regulations.49
4 Id. at 1goo. These Preemption Regulations also provide that an exception of visitorial
powers under 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), "vested in the courts of justice," does not give the state
enforcement power against national banks and operating subsidiaries by simply filing complaints
in a court. Rather, the OCC has exclusive authority to initiate administrative or judicial
proceedings to enforce state laws against its constituents. See id. at 1899-19oo.
4 Id. at 1goo-oi.
4'See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, at 233-37 (arguing that the Preemption
Regulations give a national bank and its operating subsidiary the same immunity from state laws
that the federal savings association and its operating subsidiaries possess under the "field
preemption" of the Office of Thrift Supervision).
" See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23; Nicholas Bagley, The Unwarranted
Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2274 (2004); Keith R.
Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State
Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981 (2oo6). See also American Dream,
supra note io, at 1359-7o; GAO Report, supra note 16, at 7, 17 (explaining that state officers and
consumer groups argue that the OCC's interpretation is wrong); NCLC COMMENTS, supra note
28 ("strongly urging the OCC to withdraw the proposed regulation preempting the application of
state laws to the consumer loans made by national banks and the operating subsidiaries").
46 See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, at 293-316.
" See Nicholas Bagley, supra note 45, at 2309; American Dream, supra note io,at 1369
("The OCC's primary responsibility is to monitor the safety and soundness of national banks and
their affiliates.'.
4 See American Dream, supra note io,at 1370.
4 Id. Although the OCC's predatory lending standard bars banks from making loans by
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Also, state parity laws have contributed to expanding the
OCC's preemption purview to state-based mortgage lenders. In
response to the OCC's preemption, most states adopted parity laws
declaring that state laws were not applicable to state-based depository
institutions if they were preempted for national banks and their
operating subsidiaries."0 On the one hand, parity laws address potential
transfers to the national bank charters by conferring on state-based
banks, at least, the same powers, rights and privileges as national
banks,"' allowing them to enjoy the OCC preemption applicable to
national banks and their operating subsidiaries. On the other hand, the
state's effort to curb predatory lending practices was barred by its
parity laws because the state repealed its own stringent consumer
protection laws against state-based subprime mortgage lenders. "
Accordingly, prevailing predatory lending in the subprime mortgage
market was left unchecked both at the federal and state level. 3
By the mid-2000s, there were warning signs that the subprime
mortgage market would deteriorate and, thus, banking regulators
would have to take strong consumer protection measures.54 The capital
market's increasing appetite for securitized subprime mortgages and
intensified competition .among mortgage lenders resulted in widespread
predatory lending practices, characterized by reckless or loosened
reviews on the borrower's repay ability, deceptive and unfair terms,
exorbitant interest rates or combinations thereof. " In particular,
subprime mortgage lenders predominately sold risky nontraditional
mortgage products-for example, "interest only" mortgages loans,
relying predominantly on foreclosure or the liquidation value of the borrower's collaterals, banks
can actually adopt any method to determine a borrower's repayment ability. 12 C.F.R. §§ 34. 3 (b)
and 7.4oo8(b) (as standards for making loans, "[a] bank may use any reasonable method to
determine a borrower's ability to repay"); see also Keith R. Fisher, supra note 45, at 992-94
(asserting that the OCC's lending standards direct toward safety and soundness rather than

toward consumer protection itself).
s"See GAO Report, supra note 6, at 34-36.
s Id.
5" See Nicholas Bagley, supra note 45, at 2284 ("The preemption regulation, although
technically applying only to federally chartered institutions, effectively guts state predatory
lending legislation.").
53

Id.

See John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free:Recent Developments
in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, IMF Working Paper No 07/188 1-3 (2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/20o7/wpo7188.pdf [hereinafter "IMF Working Paper"]
(pointing out that there were "warning signs" for the "U.S. subprime mortgage crisis"); Yuliya
Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert. Understandingthe Subprime Mortgage Crisis 25 (Fed. Res. Bank
of St. Louis, Working Paper 2007-05 2008), available at http://stlouisfed.org/banking/SPA/
WorkingPapers/SPA2oO7_o5.pdf [hereinafter "Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis"]
(demonstrating that problems in the subprime mortgage market were apparent, at least, by the end
14

of 2005).
"s See IMF Working Paper, supra note 54, at 7 (explaining that "strong investor appetite for
higher yielding securities in 2005-o6 probably contributed to looser underwriting standards,"
together with making "loans on the basis of expected collateral appreciation"); Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2 185, 2214-21 (2007) (emphasizing
that an increase in securitized subprime mortgages resulted in predatory lending).
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"payment-option" adjustable-rate mortgages and 2/28 adjustable-rate
mortgages ("hybrid 2/28") 56 -based on low introductory teaser rates,
little or no down payment or verification of borrowers' income, and
inadequate disclosures. 17 As a consequence, delinquency and
foreclosure rates started to soar and the safety and soundness of
subprime lenders worsened. " At last, pessimistic views on this
secondary market were realized: since early 2007, a failure in the
subprime mortgage market has deteriorated the entire financial market
in the U.S., which has since spread to the global market.5 9 This
subprime crisis has been considered the worse financial crisis since the
Great Depression.6"
This financial turbulence is generally believed to be driven by
the combined effects of a number of factors, including the slowdown in
housing prices and regional economic distress, the expansion of
improvident mortgage lending and failures of regulatory oversight,
excessive investments in complex mortgage-backed securities and overreliance on the evaluations of the credit rating agencies. 6 However, the
fundamental causes would be looser lending standards in the subprime
mortgage origination combined with regulatory failure to curb such

56 The basic nontraditional mortgage product was a hybrid 2/28, which offers a fixed rate for

two yeals and then adjusts to a variable rate for the remaining 28 years. Subprime borrowers who
obtained these products often were confronted with unaffordable monthly payments two years
later; and thus, failed to make payments and lost their homes. Adjustable-rate mortgages
originating at that time demonstrated even higher delinquency and foreclosure rates than before
and have become the main factor that has wrought havoc in the mortgage market. See IMF
Working Paper, supra note 54, at 7-9; Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra note 54,
at I, 6-1o.
17 Responding to growing concerns about the subprime mortgage market, federal bank
regulators in October 2006 jointly issued guidance on nontraditional mortgage products. Yet they
could not effectively address the problems mainly because the guidance focused only on "interestonly" and "payment-option" adjustable-rate mortgages and left unregulated the hybrid 2/28. Not
until July 2007 did federal bank regulators regulate this risky product. However, it was too late to
prevent the subprime crisis which had already begun. See Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2oo6); Statement on
Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July 10, 2007); see also LAURIE S. GOODMAN,
SHUMIN Li, DOUGLAS J. LUCAS, THOMAS A. ZIMMERMAN & FRANK J. FABOZZI, SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CREDIT DERIVATIVES 3o8-Is (2008) (arguing that the October 2oo6 Guidance should
have regulated the hybrid 2/28).
s See IMF Working Paper, supra note 54, at 8-1i.
s See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HOUSING
AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (Apr. 2oo8) (explaining that the crisis that originated in a small
segment of the U.S. subprime mortgage market has spread to the broader cross-border credit and
funding market).
IId. at 4.
6, See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Speech at the Women in Housing and
Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: Financial Markets, the Economic Outlook, and
Monetary Policy (Jan. 1O, 2oo8), available at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke2oo8olioa.htm (expressing that the financial turmoil was complicated by a number of
factors); U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 78 (2oo8), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reportsl
Blueprint.pdf [hereinafter "BLUEPRINT"] (highlighting regulatory loopholes in the U.S. oversight
system for the mortgage origination market).
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practices. 62 Given that consumer protection deregulation is, to a
substantial degree, attributable to the federal preemption of state
consumer protection laws,63 some analysts suggest the origin of the
recent mortgage crisis is in the shortsighted preemption of the federal
agencies.64 For instance, Eliot Spitzer, former Governor of New York,
criticized the federal, government "as a willing accomplice to the
lenders" who caused the subprime mortgage crisis because it utilized
65
the OCC's preemption which is detrimental to consumer protection.
Professor Paul Krugman of Princeton University also argued that the
federal government's anti-regulation was one of the causes of this crisis,
specifically noting the use of "obscure powers of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency" to "block state-level efforts to impose
'66
some oversight on subprime lending.
In this context, Part III will consider the OCC's regulatory
schemes over national bank operating subsidiaries and explore how the
OCC's constructions preempt state consumer protection laws over
those subsidiaries, which is strongly associated with the roots of today's
consumer protection crisis.

III. THE OCC's OPERATING SUBSIDIARY REGULATIONS AND
WATTERS V. WACHOVIA BANK
A. Before Preemption:Dual Control of the NationalBank Operating
Subsidiaries
until 2001, when the OCC promulgated preemptive regulations
for national bank operating subsidiaries, states controlled the activities
of those subsidiaries. Since each state has authority to regulate not only
its chartered corporations but also out-of-state corporations that

62 See IMF Working Paper, supra note 54, at 7 (pointing out that the crisis was prompted by
the growth of riskier subprime lending against rising house prices); Understanding the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, supra note 54, at 5, 25 (claiming that a deterioration of lending standards and
unsustainable growth resulted in the collapse of the market).
63 See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. i, 96-97 (arguing that preemption closely pertains to a
deregulation agenda).
4 See Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, 27 No. 3
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. I, 6 (2008) (concluding that "the roots of the subprime

mortgage crisis are to be found in the aggressively preemptive, market-oriented policies of the
current Administration"); Eliot Spitzer, Predatory Lenders' Partner in Crime: How the Bush
Administration Stopped the States From Stepping In to Help Consumers, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
2oo8, at A25; Nicholas Bagley, Subprime Safeguards We Needed, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2oo8, at
AIg (arguing that if state laws had been effective, the subprime mortgage market crisis might have
been a mini financial turmoil).
65 Eliot Spitzer, supra note 64, at A25.
6 PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2oo8 p.
164 (Ist ed. 2008).
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transact business within its boundaries,6 7 they had policed the operating
subsidiaries of the national banks, which are also corporations created
pursuant to state corporation laws.6 Regarding the policing power of
the state, the Supreme Court held that each state is legitimately
concerned with protecting the interest of its citizens by regulating
corporations not only of its own chartering but also foreign
corporations which do business within its borders.69
In particular, the Court in Lewis v. BT Investment Managers,
7
Inc. " made clear that the state can regulate out-of-state banks and nonbank corporations on the grounds of its general police power because
sound and honest practices of financial institutions are a "profound
local concern" related to the protection of the economy and its citizens."
Accordingly, the states exercised general supervision and control over
national bank operating subsidiaries in areas such as registration, fee
payment, document maintenance and state law compliance
investigations. Also, state officers brought enforcement actions against
operating subsidiaries, while the parent bank was immune from the
exercise of enforcement powers based on the OCC's exclusive visitorial
powers under the NBA. 7'
To illustrate, Michigan laws, which were at issue in Watters,
have: (i) provisions requiring an operating subsidiary of a national
bank, which is a mortgage lending company conducting business in
Michigan, to register with the state's Office of Insurance and Financial
Services; 7' (ii) provisions requiring the registrant to pay the initial
application for registrations and an annual operating fee; " (iii)
provisions requiring the operating subsidiary to file an annual financial
statement and to retain its books and records open to inspection by
OIFS examiners; 7 (iv) provisions placing the registrant under
investigation and examination of consumer complaints if a complaint is
not "being adequately pursued by the appropriate federal regulatory
to take
authority";7 6 and (v) provisions allowing the Commissioner
7
prescribed.
provisions
of
violations
on
based
action

See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23, 324-25 (2004).
Id.
Id. (quoting Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 208 (1944)).
Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (i98o).
71 Id. at 38.
72 12 U.S.C. §484(a). See also infra note 139 and accompanying text.
" MICH. COMP. LAWS H8 445.652 and 493.52 (2002).
17
68
69
70

74 MICH. COMP. LAWS

§8 445.1658, 445.i657(l), 493.54, and 493.56a(2)
§8

(2002).

445.1657(2), 445.1671, 493.56a(2), and 493.56a(13) (2002).
" MICH. CoMP. LAWS
76 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1663(2) (2002) ("[T]he commissioner.., shall make

no

investigation of the complaint if the complaint is being adequately pursued by the appropriate
federal regulatory authority.").
77 MICH. COMP. LAWS 88 445.665, 445.1666, 493-58-59, and 493.62a

(2002).
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B. Watters v. Wachovia Bank: Affirmation of the OCC's Construction
Such state authority, however, was overruled by the OCC's
preemption regulation in 2001. The overlap between state laws and the
OCC's regulations raised contentious debates regarding whether the
NBA and the OCC regulations preempted state laws over the operating
subsidiary. The courts have sided in favor of the OCC. 78 The district
court and the appeals court found in favor of Wachovia Mortgage
Corporation ("Wachovia Mortgage") and Wachovia Bank, a national
bank,79 and in April 2007, the Supreme Court in Watters, in a 5-3
decision, sided with the OCC's construction of the NBA." The court
held that an operating subsidiary is exclusively subject to the OCC's
visitorial powers under the NBA."1
In Watters, Wachovia Mortgage filed suit against Linda
Watters in her official capacity as chairperson of the Michigan Office of
Insurance and Financial Services, claiming that the NBA itself and the
OCC's regulations preempt certain of Michigan's bank regulatory
statutes." Originally, Wachovia Mortgage was subject to Michigan
statutes in connection with its mortgage business in Michigan.13 In
2003, Wachovia Mortgage became a wholly owned operating
subsidiary of Wachovia Bank, a national bank, and took the position
that it was no longer bound by Michigan's registration and inspection
requirements.84 Watters responded by informing Wachovia Mortgage
that refusal to comply with the relevant state regulations would
preclude it from conducting mortgage lending activities in Michigan. 5
The Supreme Court, however, affirmed and held that Michigan laws
have no authority to oversee the mortgage activities of the operating
subsidiaries of national banks which are under the umbrella of the
86
OCC.

78 National City Bank v. Turnbaugh, 463 F. 3 d 325 (4 th Cir. 20o6); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v.
Burke, 414 F. 3 d 305 (2d Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2005).
71 Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004), affd, 431 F.3d 556
(6th Cir. 2005).
o Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). Unlike other preemption cases
involving banking laws, which were decided unanimously, the opinions of the Justices in Watters
were sharply divided.
, Id. at 1565, 1573.
s' Id. at 1565.

83 Id.
84 Id.
8s Id.

" Id.
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C. Review of the OCC's Regulatory Scheme for OperatingSubsidiaries
and the Supreme Court's Decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank
In preempting state laws pertaining to operating subsidiaries,
the OCC effectively connected incidental powers to preemptive
authority. First, the OCC has interpreted that national banks can use
operating subsidiaries in conducting banking activities as "a
department of national banks" pursuant to incidental powers under the
NBA. Second, the .OCC argued that such incidental power logically
leads to a conclusion that the OCC regulates the operating subsidiary to
the same extent as it does its parent banks. Finally, the OCC concluded
that, because it has the same regulatory authority over operating
subsidiaries as it does over parent national banks, its regulations
preempt state laws over operating subsidiaries to the same extent as
over their parent banks. As a consequence, the OCC declared that
operating subsidiaries, like their national parent banks, are subject to
the OCC's exclusive visitorial powers. The Supreme Court in Watters
endorsed the OCC's construction.
i. Incidental Power to Use Operating Subsidiaries
The national bank's "incidental powers" played a paramount
role in the Supreme Court's decision in Watters.87 The Court noted
twice that Watters did not contest the incidental power of national
banks to "do business through operating subsidiaries."88 Because of the
central role the OCC's interpretation of incidental powers played in the
Court's decision, that interpretation will be examined in detail.
Under § 24(7) of the NBA, a national bank is authorized to
exercise "incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking.. ."" Since the enactment of the NBA, courts and
commentators have construed the concept of incidental powers as
flexible and expansive.9" A national bank's activity is interpreted as an
17 See Boutris, 419 F. 3 d at 959 (stating that the incidental powers clause is "central to our
analysis here, as it is the basis for the OCC's permission to national banks to create and operate
banking functions, through subsidiaries"); see also James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries:
Free at Last or More of Same?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 673 (1997) (explaining that, while there is
no specific ground provision to support the authority to use operating subsidiaries, the national
bank's incidental power "seems too well established to be successfully challenged now").
8 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1569-7o. The State of Michigan did not challenge the concept of
incidental powers itself. See also Brief for the Petitioner, at 21, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
127 S. Ct. I559 (2007) (No. 05-1342) (stating that "no one disputes that 12 USC [§] 24 (Seventh)
authorizes national banks to use nonbank operating subsidiaries"). Instead, Watters insisted the
OCC erroneously extended the scope of incidental powers to the visitorial powers over a
subsidiary, contrary to the congressional intent expressed in §§ 481 and 484(a) in detail. See id. at
12-17.
12

U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).

90 See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 431 (ist Cir. 1972) (quoting Curtis v.
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incidental power if it is "convenient and useful" in connection with the
business of banking9 1and it is "not limited to the enumerated powers in
§ 24

seventh.9' 2 Just as the concept of the "business of banking" has

expanded in scope to keep up with the banking market's emerging
customer needs, new technologies, and increased competition,
incidental powers have also expanded over time. 93 The OCC is
authorized to interpret the scope of incidental powers on the grounds
that it is charged with surveillance of the business of banking under the
NBA.94 The scope of incidental powers, however, is not unlimited. The
Court held that the exercise of the OCC's discretionary authority "must
be kept within reasonable bounds," noting that "[v]entures distant from
dealing in financial investment instruments-for example, operating a
general travel agency-may exceed those bounds."95
Under the rubric of incidental powers, the OCC has authorized
national banks to use operating subsidiaries to conduct banking
business.96 The OCC has recognized the operating subsidiary as an
alternative way for national banks to engage in banking activities.
Therefore, an operating subsidiary may engage in virtually the same
scope of activities as is permissible for its national bank parent,98 with
Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9,64 (1857) (explaining that "necessity is a word of flexible meaning")). See also M
& M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat. Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (gth Cir. 1977) (holding that
incidental powers should be construed to "permit the use of new ways of conducting the very old
business of banking"); Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie Jr., The Business of Banking:
Looking to the Future-PartII, 52 BUS. LAW. 1279 (1997) (maintaining that incidental powers
should be interpreted broadly and flexibly to accommodate the development of new banking
services).
01 Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 432 (holding that an activity is authorized as an incidental
power if it is "convenient or useful" in connection with the performance of an express power of the
NBA); see also M & M Leasing Corp., 563 F.2d at 1382 (agreeing with Arnold Tours that to be an
incidental power, it must be "convenient or useful").
12 NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258 n.2 0995)
[hereinafter "VALIC"]. In VALIC, th Court "expressly [held] that the 'business of banking' is not
limited to the enumerated powers in § 24 Seventh" and concluded that selling annuities as an
agency is incidental to brokering financial investment instruments-a banking business not
enumerated in § 24(7). Accordingly, the incidental powers are not limited to activities incidental to
enumerated powers but include those incidental to non-expressed business.
" See OCC, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL BANK i (June 2008) (explaining
that "[t]he business of banking is an evolving concept and the permissible activities of national
banks similarly evolve over time"); see also Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie Jr., supra note
90, at 1280-8 i, 1299 (arguing that as the business of banking evolves, incidental powers must "also
evolve with the business of banking").
"' See VALIC, 513 U.S. at 256 (reaffirmed the interpretive authority of the OCC, citing that
the OCC is responsible for the surveillance of a national bank's exercise of incidental powers and
the business of banking) (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987)).
15 Id. at 258 n. 2.
96 See Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations Corporation, 31
Fed. Reg. HI,459 (Aug. 31, 1966) [hereinafter "1966 Regulation"].
97 1966 Regulation, 31 Fed. Reg. at i1,46o; Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 19oo
(interpreting the operating subsidiary as a "Federally-authorized and Federally-licensed means by
which a national bank may conduct Federally-authorized activities").
98 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(I) provides :
(i) Authorized activities: A national bank may conduct in an operating subsidiary
activities that are permissible for a national bank to engage in directly either as part
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the exception of taking deposits.99 The OCC argues that such incidental
power to use operating subsidiaries was recognized in the GLBA in
i999.' ° In Watters, the Supreme Court also observes that "[t]he GLBA
simply demonstrates Congress' formal recognition that national banks
have incidental power to do business through operating subsidiaries. '
The OCC's policy determination grants national banks the
authority to utilize operating subsidiaries as a "convenient and useful
form for conducting banking activities."'' 2 The OCC has considered
operating subsidiaries a desirable way to meet rapid changes in the
banking industry."°3 The operating subsidiary structure has facilitated
new product and service offerings and allowed banks to restructure
their businesses. 104 Importantly, the subsidiary structure protects
national banks from the liability of the subsidiary and thus maintains
their safety and soundness. "' Since an operating subsidiary is a
separate state-chartered corporation and not a chartered bank,
fundamental principles of corporate law that limit liability apply to the
parent bank-operating subsidiary relationship.'0
Furthermore, the OCC construes incidental powers as a legal
authorization for national banks to exercise banking activities
indirectly. Even if an operating subsidiary-a separate legal entityconducts those activities, the OCC deems them to be activities of the
parent bank because the operating subsidiary is merely an alternative

of, or incidental to, the business of banking, as determined by the OCC, or otherwise
under the other statutory authority, including: (i) Providing authorized products as
principal; and (ii) Providing title insurance as principal....
9 See, e.g., RISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 247 (2d ed. 2004).
"o See Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at i9oi (explaining that the OCC's regulations
"reflect express Congressional recognition in section 121 of the GLBA that national banks may
own subsidiaries that engage 'solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage in
directly"').
Watters, 127 S. Ct. at I572 n.I2.
Wo
102 See Investment Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784,
34,788 (July 2, 20o) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4oo6) ("For decades national banks have been
authorized to use the operating subsidiary as a convenient and useful corporate form for
conducting activities that the parent bank could conduct directly.").
'o'See 1966 Regulation, 31 Fed. Reg. at 11,46o (observing that the use of a subsidiary is a
significant option that could extend banking products and services functionally and geographically
and permit banks to reorganize to control operating costs, improve the effectiveness of supervision,
and decentralize management decisions).
104 Id.

" National banks have established operating subsidiaries basically to insulate themselves
from the effect of the failure of the subsidiaries and thereby could maintain their safety and
soundness: See Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 6o,342, 60,354
(Nov. 27, 1996) [hereinafter "1996 Regulation"] (explaining that a separate subsidiary structure can
reduce risks of new activities by distinguishing the subsidiary's activities from those of the parent
bank as a legal matter) (citation omitted).
106 See, e.g., Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that "the primary
advantage of maintaining an operating subsidiary as a separate corporation is that it shields the
national bank from the operating subsidiaries' liabilities) (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 61 (1998)).
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tool of the parent bank with respect to that activity.' °7 The OCC
supports its conclusions as follows:
Courts have consistently treated operating subsidiaries as
equivalent to national banks in determining their power and status
under Federal law, unless Federal law requires otherwise. Operating
subsidiaries are consolidated with-that is, their assets and liabilities
are indistinguishable from-the parent bank for accounting purposes,
regulatory reporting purposes, and for purposes of applying many
Federal statutory or regulatory limits. They are, in essence, no more
than incorporated departments of the bank itself.'
The Supreme Court in Watters endorsed the OCC's
interpretations. Citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, °9
the Court held that it has concentrated on "the exercise of a national
bank's powers, not on its corporate structure.""' Also, the Court stated
that it has treated operating subsidiaries as equivalent to national
banks with respect to powers."' As a sample case, it suggested VALIC,
which upheld the OCC's decision that the national bank has an
incidental power to act as an agent in the sale of annuities, even though
the activity is exercised by operating subsidiaries. 12 Indeed, the
Supreme Court recognized that the operating subsidiary can exercise
incidental powers under § 24(7) as its parent national bank does.
National Bank
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,

.

Incidental Powers

.,I

-- - - - - -

T

............ ,
(1) Investment Activities

I
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(2) Subsidiary's Own Activities
Customers
--

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

I

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

--

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

107 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

.0.Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at i9oo; see also Investment Securities; Bank
Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 7.4oo6) (describing operating subsidiaries as "the equivalent of departments or divisions
of their parent banks").
9 Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996).
11

Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 0570.

.

Id. at 1571.

...Id. The Court also cited Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987), which deals in
part with activities of operating subsidiaries of national banks. For the critical analysis of the
Court's reasoning, see discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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The OCC claims that the 1966 regulation first recognized a
national bank's incidental authority "to use operating subsidiaries like a
department of the parent bank."..3 However, the incidental power
recognized in the 1966 regulation was rather to "purchase or acquire
and hold stock" of operating subsidiaries.114 Not until the OCC's 1969
interpretive ruling did it apply the concept of incidental powers to the
use of an operating subsidiary and, thus, by implication declare its
regulatory power over those subsidiaries." 5
2.

The OCC's Exclusive Oversight Power

Similar to incidental powers, the Supreme Court repeated that
Michigan's commissioner did not dispute the OCC's authority to
regulate operating subsidiaries to the same extent as the national
bank. 1 6 Connecting Congress' recognition of the incidental power to
use operating subsidiaries with the OCC's regulatory authority, the
Supreme Court stated that "[fWor supervisory purposes, OCC treats
national banks and their operating subsidiaries as a single. economic
enterprise."".7
The OCC's regulation provides that "[a]n operating subsidiary
conducts activities.., pursuant to the same authorization, terms and
conditions that apply to the conduct of such activities by its parent
national bank." 1,8Basically, the OCC claims that since the operating
subsidiary is regarded as an incorporated division of the bank itself, the
OCC has the same regulatory authority over the subsidiary as it has
over the parent bank." 9 As grounds for this power, the OCC refers to
incidental powers and its broad interpretive authority, citing the Ninth
"i
See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1562, 1569 (explaining that the OCC has made clear since 1966
that the national bank has the incidental authority to use an operating subsidiary). See also
Boutris, 419 F. 3 d at 960; Burke, 414 F. 3 d at 317, 319.
'
See r966 Regulation, 31 Fed. Reg. at 11,459-6o ("[T]he authority of a national bank to
purchase or otherwise acquire and hold stock of a subsidiary operation corporation may properly
be founded among such incidental powers of the bank "as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. 24(7)"); Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1577 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (explaining that in 1966 the OCC took the position that "a national bank may
acquire and hold the controlling stock interest in a subsidiary operations corporation"). See also
Memorandum from Julie L. Williams, Chief Counsel to Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the
Currency, Legal Authority for Revised Operating Subsidiary Regulation, at Section 4 (Nov. 18,
1996), availableat http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/part5.htm (last visited Nov. I3, 2oo8).
"' See Memorandum from Julie L. Williams, supra note 114, at Section 5 (stating that the
1969 ruling provided that (i) national banks could engage in banking business by means of an
operating subsidiary, (ii) a subsidiary could perform any business function that the parent bank
could perform and (iii) federal banking laws applicable to a parent bank were equally applicable to
its operating subsidiaries).
"I6 Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1569-70.
n1 Id. at 1570 ("OCC oversees both entities by reference to "business line," applying the
same controls.') (citing the OCC, RELATED ORGANIZATIONS: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, at 64
(August 2004)) [hereinafter "COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK"].
is12
C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3) (2oo8).
"'
See Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 19oo.
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Circuit's decision in Boutris which addresses the preemption of
California law regulating the operating subsidiary. 121 In this case, the
court explained that the authority to interpret the scope of incidental
powers necessarily includes the ability to police the exercise of those
powers. 121 Then, it concluded that Congress granted the OCC
regulatory authority over the operating subsidiary under the incidental
powers clause by reference when it granted the OCC power to permit
2
such a subsidiary.1

This construction is supported on two grounds which were also
expressed in Watters-consolidation supervision and the definition
clause in the GLBA.123 First, the OCC observed that it has combined
the assets and liabilities of the operating subsidiary with the parent
bank for regulatory purposes, creating consolidated supervision over
the combined entity." 4 Second, the OCC relies on § 24a(g)(3)(A) of the
GLBA, which defines an operating subsidiary as a subsidiary that
"engages solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage
in directly and are conducted subject to the same terms and conditions
that govern the conduct of such activities by national banks .... " The
OCC has interpreted the phrase "terms and conditions" to include
"how, and by whom, the operating subsidiary is examined and
supervised.' ' 2 In other words, the OCC regards Congress' definition in
the GLBA as express grants of the incidental power to use an operating
subsidiary and of the OCC's oversight power over the subsidiary's
activities. 126
3. Preemption of State Laws and Visitorial Powers
Under the assumption of the uncontested incidental power and
the OCC's same regulatory authority under the GLBA, the OCC
claimed that activities of the operating subsidiary have the same effect
as those of the parent bank for preemption purposes and issued
preemptive regulations in 200,127 providing that "[s]tate laws apply to
national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws
apply to the parent national bank." Regardless of whether the parent
Id. at I9OI.
...Boutris, 419 F. 3 d at 96I (applying M&M Leasing's logic that the OCC's authority "to
12

regulate national banks' leasing activities is inherent in his authority to interpret the "incidental
powers" provision to allow such leasing in the first place").
122 Id.
12

Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1570.
Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at i9o; 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(4)(i) (2oo8)

124 See

(providing that "[plertinent book figures of the parent national bank and its operating subsidiary
shall be combined for the purpose of applying statutory or regulatory limitations when
combination is needed to effect the intent of the statute or regulation, e.g., for purposes of 12
U.S.C. 56, 6o, 84, and 37 Id').
5 See Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at igoi.
126 Id.

"2 See Investment Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784,
34,788-89 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4oo6).
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bank or its operating subsidiary conducts an activity, the same
preemption rules apply. 12 The OCC suggested that this regulation
creates no new preemption doctrine, but simply reflects the conclusion
that courts would reach
based on federal statutes, OCC regulations and
129
precedent case law.

To demonstrate that state laws are applicable to the operating
subsidiary to the same extent as they are to the national bank, the
Supreme Court, as a first step, explained preemptive principles as
applied to national banks. The Court emphasized the holding in
Barnett Bank that both banks' enumerated and incidental powers
constitute "grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather
ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law."' 3 Moreover, state laws are
preempted when preventing or significantly interfering "with the
national bank's or the national bank regulator's exercise of its
powers."' 3 1Additionally, the Court cited 12 U.S.C. § 371(a), providing
that the national bank is authorized to engage in mortgage business
subject to the OCC's regulation' and held that states' control over the
mortgage lending business is preempted because a "state may not
significantly burden a national bank's own exercise of its real estate
lending power, just as it may not curtail or hinder a national bank's
efficient exercise of any other power, incidental or enumerated under
' In particular, the Court underscored that "real estate
the NBA."133
lending, when conducted by a national bank, is immune from state
visitorial control" pursuant to the visitorial powers of § 484(a)"'34
Next, the Supreme Court extended such preemption principles
applicable to the national bank to its operating subsidiary, reasoning
that "just as duplicative state examination, supervision, and regulation
would significantly burden mortgage lending when engaged in by
national banks, so too would those state controls interfere with that
' 135
same activity when engaged in by an operating subsidiary."
Preemptive regulation for operating subsidiaries is recognized as a
"necessary consequence" of the statutory provisions of the NBA-§§
24(7), 24a(g)(3)(A) and 371(a)--and of preemption principles. 136
See id.
l29See Investment Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. at
34,79o; see also Burke, 414 F.3d at 319-20 (arguing that the OCC's preemptive regulation clarifies
the existing preemption of state laws).
'o See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1567 (quoting Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32).
131 Id.
132 Id. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) provides that "any national banking association may make,
arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in real estate,
subject to 1828(0) of this title and such restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the
Currency may prescribe by regulation or order."
Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1567-68.
m Id. at 1568.
'~' Id. at 1570.
136 Id. at 1572.
'z
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Therefore, the Court summarizes that preemption is just an effect of
the NBA: "A national bank has the power to engage in real estate
lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and
conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be
significantly impaired or impeded by state law.' 1 37 In other words, the
OCC's authority to promulgate preemption regulation was justified by
the NBA itself.
The preemption purview extended to operating subsidiaries
justifies the OCC's exclusive exercise of visitorial powers over
operating subsidiaries, just as it has over parent banks." 8 Under the
NBA, national banks are not subject to state officers' examination,
inspection of the bank's books and records, regulation and supervision
of activities and enforcement of federal and state laws.'39 Since the
subsidiary is treated as the national bank itself for regulatory purposes,
the subsidiary should also enjoy immunity from the state's
interventions. Therefore, the OCC maintained that it has exclusive
authority to investigate operating subsidiaries regarding compliance
with both federal and state laws and that it alone can seek the
necessary enforcement measures,140 even though § 484(a) clearly grants
the OCC visitorial powers to the "national bank," not "operating
subsidiaries." In Watters, the Supreme Court concluded that Wachovia
Mortgage is immune from the state's visitorial powers because the
operating subsidiary is subject to the OCC's exclusive visitorial powers
under § 484(a) as is its parent bank.'
4. Rebutting Arguments of the State of Michigan in Watters
Watters contended that Congress unambiguously gave the OCC
preemption power over state laws only with regard to national banks,
and not their state-chartered operating subsidiaries under 12 U.S.C. §
484(a). 42 She focused on the fact that § 484(a) provides only that a
137

Id.

See Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at i9oo (stating that "under 12 U.S.C. 24
(Seventh) and 12 CFR 7.4oo6, the standards of section 484 apply to the national bank operating
subsidiaries to the same extent as their national bank").
139 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (providing that "[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visitorial
powers except as authorized by Federal law" with some exceptions). Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §
7.4ooo(a)(2), visitorial powers include examination of a bank, inspection of a bank's books and
records, regulation and supervision of activities and enforcing compliance. The Court explained
that "visitation" is "the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to
examine into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and
regulations." Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1568 (quoting Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, i58 (1905)).
"0 Preemption Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at i9oo-oi.
' Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1564-65 ("[W]e hold that Wachovia's mortgage business, whether
conducted by the bank itself or through the bank's operating subsidiary, is subject to OCC's
superintendence, and not to the licensing, reporting, and visitorial regimes of the several States in
which the subsidiary operates.").
' See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 1-2, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 127 S. Ct.
'
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"national bank" is subject to exclusive visitorial powers of the OCC,
rather than an "operating subsidiary."14' 3 She asserted that if Congress
had intended to deny the state's visitorial powers over operating
subsidiaries, it would have referenced
not only the "national bank" but
14
also "its affiliates" in § 484(a).
To support this construction, Watters first argued that an
operating subsidiary such as Wachovia Mortgage is an "affiliate" and is
not itself a "national bank" under the NBA. 4 ' The operating subsidiary
falls within the "affiliate" definition in

12

U.S.C. § 22ia(b)

46

which

47

includes any corporation controlled by a national bank. Then, she
maintained that Congress spoke directly to the OCC's authority over
the bank's affiliates in 12 U.S.C. § 481 rather than § 484(a). 141 Under §
481, the OCC may examine the national bank's affiliates but only "as
shall be necessary to disclose fully the relations between such bank and
such affiliates and the effect of such relations upon the affairs of such
49
bank.
Pointing out that affiliates are not subject to the OCC's
visitorial powers under § 481, Watters argued that the OCC has only
limited and nonexclusive authority over affiliates.' Moreover, Watters
contended that her construction was confirmed by the presumption
against preemption; a basic preemption principle that "the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'' She
argued that because Congress did not demonstrate a clear and manifest
purpose to preempt state laws under the NBA, the traditional state
authority to protect consumers should not be preempted. 2 That is,
"[t]he presumption against preemption bars any attempt to read
operating subsidiaries by implication into § 484(a)."' 3
The Supreme Court, however, rejected Watters' contentions for
two reasons. First, when §§ 481 and 484(a) were enacted and amended
in 1864 and in

1933

respectively, Congress did not speak of the state's

1559 (2007) (No. 05-i342).
143 Id.

144 Id. at4; see also Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571.
4' See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 142, at 3.
146 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (providing that "the term "affiliate" shall include any corporation,
business trust, association, or other similar organization" of which a bank "directly or indirectly,
owns or controls" either a majority of the voting shares or more than 5o% of the voting shares).
147 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 142, at 5.
... Id. at 3.
149 Id.
'50 Id. at 3-4.
"'
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 88, at 22-23 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
l52 Id. at 24-26.
'5' Id. at 26.
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visitorial powers over operating subsidiaries.' * Therefore, the Supreme
Court stated that it could not find Congressional intent regarding the
operating subsidiary from those provisions. 155 Second, the Court
delineated the difference between "operating subsidiaries" and
"affiliates" in § 22ia(b) by pointing out that Congress distinguishes
operating subsidiaries from other affiliates such as financial
subsidiaries in the GLBA. 156 While an operating subsidiary may
"engag[e] solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage
in directly," other affiliates may "engage in non-banking financial
activities, e.g., securities and insurance" under state regulatory
powers.157 Accordingly, the Court refused to include the operating
subsidiary within the general term "affiliates" under § 481, thereby
denying it to be the ground of state's visitorial powers over operating
subsidiaries.'5

The application of Chevron deference was rejected by the Court
because § 7.40o6 is a mere clarification of proper interpretations of the
NBA. 5' Additionally, the Court also rejected Watters' arguments that
§ 7.4oo6 violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution on the
grounds that the preemptive regulation is "a prerogative of Congress
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses."16
D. Dissenting Opinion in Watters v. Wachovia Bank
The dissent shows no Congressional intent to preempt state
laws, focusing instead on analyzing preemption principles rather than
challenging incidental power itself and the OCC's oversight power.
Absent congressional intent to do so, the dissent argues the dual
banking system and state's interest to protect consumers cannot be set
aside.
i. Views on Incidental Powers and Oversight Power
Contrary to the majority, which turns to unchallenged
incidental powers, the dissent argues that Congress itself has never
authorized or disavowed incidental power to use an operating

154 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571.

l55Id.
156 Id.
Id. at 1571-72.
I'
158 See id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at
18, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342) (arguing that § 481 "in no way signals a specific intention
concerning treatment of an operating subsidiary").
9 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572.
0 Id. at 1573 (citation omitted).

Challenging the Roots of the Subprime Crisis

2009]

303

subsidiary,16 1 nor has it authorized the power to license and regulate
operating subsidiaries. 61 2 The dissent notes that notwithstanding the
silence of Congress, the OCC has permitted the national bank's
ownership of the operating subsidiary since 1966.163 Also, it interprets
the provisions of the GLBA as a "rejection of the OCC's position that
an operating subsidiary could engage in activities that national banks
could not engage in directly." ' 64 The dissent, however, does not
completely reject the assertion that the OCC has oversight power over
the operating subsidiary in its analysis of preemptive intent in. the
GLBA.

161

The dissent argues that the statement "a department of a bank"
is unreasonable in the context of Chevron because such a statement
cannot be reconciled with the principle of corporate separateness under
the state's corporate laws although it justifies the preemption of state
laws. The dissent reasons that the parent banks cannot utilize
insulation from the liability of operating subsidiaries because the
corporate veil should be pierced if the operating subsidiary is acting like
a part of the parent bank. 166
2.

No Intent of Congress to Preempt State Laws

The dissent, by examining the text of §§ 481 and 484(a) of the
NBA, agrees with Watters that these provisions reflect Congress' intent
not to preempt state laws governing operating subsidiaries. 67 The
dissent explains that Congress has conferred on the OCC extensive
supervisory power over affiliates, including operating subsidiaries
under § 481, but it has never expanded the OCC's visitorial powers to
"affiliates" under § 484(a).16 Regarding the application of Barnett
Bank, the dissent argues that preemptive regulation does not apply to
this case where Congress has demonstrated a clear and manifest
161 Id.

at 1577 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress "neither disavowed nor

endorsed the Comptroller's position on national bank ownership of operating subsidiaries").
162 Id. at 1578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress did not authorize the OCC to
license any state-chartered entity).
163 Id. at 1577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165Id. at i58i (Stevens, J., dissenting) (although the dissent contends that the GLBA does
not demonstrate the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to preempt the state law at issue
here, they reluctantly mentioned the "same terms and conditions" might reflect "an uncontroversial
acknowledgement that operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject to the same federal
oversight as their national bank parents.").
166 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The OCC's regulation] is about
whether a state corporation can avoid complying with state regulations, yet nevertheless take
advantage of state laws insulating its owners from liability."). See discussion infra Part IV.A.i.
167 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at i578-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 142-i5o and
accompanying text.
'6' Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1578-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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purpose not to preempt state laws.169 Moreover, the dissent notes that'
"four words" of the GLBA--"same terms and conditions"-- does not
70
represent the intent of Congress to preempt state laws.
Alternatively, the dissent points out that the OCC lacks the
authority to promulgate preemptive regulations."'7 Distinguishing "rules
authorizing or regulating conduct" from "rules granting immunity from
regulation," the dissent observes that incidental powers authorize or
regulate the conduct of national banks. 2 For example, pursuant to
incidental powers, the OCC has the authority to decide whether
national banks can conduct the businesses of mortgage brokers, real
estate brokers, or travel agencies directly, or through operating
subsidiaries.7 3 But such authority does not "imply the far greater power
to immunize banks or their subsidiaries from state laws regulating the
conduct of their competitors."' 74
Furthermore, although the agency's interpretation may be
entitled to some weight, "' the dissent contends that the OCC's
regulation does not deserve Chevron deference for three reasons: first,
unlike Congress, federal agencies do not represent the states' interests,
so their determinations of the scope of preemption should not be
entitled to deference;' 76 second, the "same terms and conditions" of the
GLBA cannot be incorporated into preemptive regulation because the
use of that phrase "says nothing about preemption"; 177 third, "a
department of a bank" is inconsistent with the limited liability of parent
78
banks under corporate laws. 1
3. Concerns About Consumer Protection
The dissent expresses particular concerns about the dual
banking system and consumer protection as a banking policy.' 79 It
points out that the OCC's preemption which modifies "competitive
69 Id. at 1579-8o (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court neglects to mention that Barnett Bank
is quite clear that this interpretive rule applies only when Congress has failed (as it often does) to
manifest an explicit preemptive intent.").
17o Id. at 1581-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) The dissent further argues that even assuming the
relevance of the GLBA with preemption, state laws are in effect because those laws are basic legal
rules governing the making of real estate loans, even if they encroach on the banking business.
Ibid.
1Id.
at 1582-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1584 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 1584 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Wihen an agency purports to decide the scope of
federal preemption, a healthy respect for state sovereignty calls for something less than Chevron
deference.").
17 Id. at 1584-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17' Id. at i585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Watters, 727 S.Ct. at i58i, I585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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equality" between federal and state banks may drive operating
subsidiaries to transfer federal charters, harming state-based
competitors and "hamstring[ing] States' ability to regulate the affairs of
state corporations."' 8 ° In addition, the dissent criticizes the OCC's
preemption of a state's ability to protect consumers because states have
traditionally performed the role of consumer protection and their laws
cannot be avoided without the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.""'S
IV. CHALLENGING INCIDENTAL POWERS IN THE OCC'S OPERATING
SUBSIDIARIES REGULATION AND WATTERS V. WACHOVIA BANK

As the Supreme Court points out, the preemption of Michigan
laws is just a "necessary consequence" of incidental authority to use a
subsidiary and the OCC's regulatory oversight over the subsidiary.'82
Nevertheless, this concept was not sufficiently disputed by Michigan or
the dissenting opinion. This part of the paper challenges the OCC's
construction of incidental powers and the OCC's regulatory powers for
the first time. Then, it concludes that such a construction exceeds the
OCC's delegated power under the NBA.
A. "A Department of a Bank" as a Rationale of Incidental Powers
i. Is It Policy Determination or Legal Authority?
For the purpose of applying corporate laws, "a department of a
bank" respects the corporate separateness between the parent bank and
its operating subsidiary. The OCC has long asserted that activities of
•operating subsidiaries be distinguished from those of the parent bank as
a legal matter; and thus the corporate veil cannot be pierced in the
national bank-operating subsidiary relationship." 3 Therefore, according
's0 Id. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Id. at s581 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is especially troubling that the Court so blithely
preempts Michigan laws designed to protect consumers. Consumer protection is quintessentially a
"field which the States have traditionally occupied": the Court should therefore have been all the
more reluctant to conclude that the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" was to set aside the
laws of a sovereign State.") (citation omitted).
' Id.
at 1572; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 158, at 20 (arguing that incidental power to use an operating subsidiary
"bears a "close and logical" connection to" the preemption of state laws).
183 See 1996 Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,354 ("[Tlhe use of a separate subsidiary structure
can enhance the safety and soundness of conducting new activities by distinguishing the
subsidiary's activities from those of the parent bank (as a legal matter) and allowing more focused
management and monitoring of its operations."); see also Burke, 414 F.3 d at 319 (holding that
"[tlhe OCC is not disregarding any principle of corporate separateness" and "[s]ection 7.4oo6
reflects the OCC's policy judgment that national banks' use of operating subsidiaries as separately
structured corporate entities is desirable and that it should not be hindered by state regulations");
Brief for the Respondents, at 44-45, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No.
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to the OCC, even a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent bank does
not warrant the conclusion that the subsidiary is a mere
instrumentality.184 To be consistent with this view, the OCC requires
the parent bank to control the operating subsidiary effectively
("effective control"), not predominantly. 8 '
In other words, the OCC describes "a department of a bank" as
a reflection of its policy determination that a national bank can conduct
banking business through a legally separated operating subsidiary that
is not being controlled by the parent to an extent that would make it an
internal organization.
The OCC's position described above is, however, different from
its treatment of "a department of the bank" with respect to activities,
powers and regulatory treatment. Arguing that "a department of a
bank" signifies that the operating subsidiary is a replica of a national
bank," 6 the OCC assumes that the national bank has far greater control
over the subsidiary than a general corporation has over its subsidiaries.
To be sure, the degree that the parent bank controls its operating
subsidiaries exceeds the standard of "effective control" set forth by the
OCC regulation.
. The OCC legally determines that the activities of the operating
subsidiary are equivalent to those of the parent bank because the
subsidiary is essentially like "a department of a bank."'8 7 As explained
above, the OCC construes incidental power as a legal authorization for
national banks to exercise banking activities indirectly.'88 Even though
the OCC argues that corporate separateness between the bank and its
subsidiaries is strictly observed, the OCC determines that the
05-1342) (arguing that the OCC's operating subsidiaries regulation is "entirely consistent with

basic tenets of corporate law, including the principle of corporate separateness").
184 See, e.g., Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d 674, 68, (Del. Ch. 1978) ("Mere
control and even total ownership of one corporation by another is not sufficient to warrant the
disregard of a separate corporate entity."); S. Side Bank v. T.S.B. Corp., 419 N.E. 2d 477, 479 (Ill.
App. Ct. 198I) ("Ownership of capital stock in one corporation by another does not, itself, create
an identity of corporate interest between the two companies, nor render the stockholding company
the owner of the property of the other nor create the relation of principal and agent, representative,
or alter ego between the two.").
's See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2) (2007) (providing that to qualify as an operating subsidiary, the
national bank must own and control more than 5o percent of voting interest of the operating
subsidiary or the bank must control thesubsidiary and no other party controls more than 5o
percent). In order to attract minor investors by allowing for the flexibility of an operating
subsidiary structure and, at the same time, to avoid losing control of the subsidiary, the OCC in
1996 loosened the degree of ownership of operating subsidiaries from "at least 8o%" to "more than
50%" or "when the bank otherwise controls the subsidiary." Also, the national bank must hold
effective control over its operating subsidiaries. See 1996 Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 6o,349-50;
Smoot, supra note 87, at 665, 686-9o. Moreover, the OCC interpreted that the bank's ownership of
io% is sufficient to be a qualifying operating subsidiary. OCC Conditional Approval No. 646 at i
(June 28, 2004); see also Brief for the National Association of Realtors(R) as Amicus Curiae in
support of Petitioner, at 15 n.2 i, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342).
" See supra notes 97, 107 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes io8-1.12 ard accompanying text.
"' See supra notes x07-io8 and accompanying text.
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subsidiary is no more than a mere agency of the parent bank. Also, "a
department of a bank" is a legal ground for justifying the OCC's
preemptive authority." 9 For regulatory purposes, the OCC has treated
the operating subsidiary as a part of the parent bank, claiming that
both are a single economic entity and, accordingly, are consolidated in
applying the OCC's regulations. 9 ° By presupposing "a single entity,"
the OCC preempts state laws over operating subsidiaries.
The description by the OCC of "a department of a bank" serves
two purposes at the same time: shielding a national bank from
unlimited liability from its operating subsidiary's activities and
extending the OCC's regulatory jurisdiction to operating subsidiaries.
However, as the dissent points out, such construction is not reasonable
because the statement of a "department of a bank" for preemption
purposes is incompatible with corporate separateness under state
corporation laws. '' In addition, as discussed below, the OCC's
construction must be rejected because it is contrary to the language of §
24(7) of the NBA, and Congress has not given the OCC exclusive
oversight over operating subsidiaries given the structure of the NBA as
"entity regulation."
B. Limitations of the Language of the Incidental Powers Clause
The national bank's ability to deem activities of the subsidiary
as its own exceeds prescribed incidental powers. Given the language of
§ 24(7), incidental power is limited to the direct activity of the national
bank to own and control operating subsidiaries. Applying this
reasoning to Watters, Wachovia Bank has the power to own and
control Wachovia Mortgage, whose permissible business is that of
mortgage lending business. However, no longer does it have the ability
to deem ordinary day-to-day mortgage lending activities of Wachovia
Mortgage as those of Wachovia Bank.
i. National Bank Exercises Incidental Powers "By its Board"
As the Supreme Court has stated, "the 'plain purpose' of
legislation... is determined in the first instance with reference to the
plain language of the statute itself."' 92 The language of the statute

See Discussion, supra Part IIf. C. 3 .
See Discussion, supra Part I. C.2.
191 See supra notes 66, 178 and accompanying text.
192 Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 (1986);
see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (stating that "the starting point in
discerning Congressional intent is the existing statutory context").
's9
"9
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should be the first consideration. 193 Congressional intent to specify a list
of the corporate powers of a national bank is indicated in 12 U.S.C. §
24, titled "Corporate powers of associations.' 1 94 In particular, § 24(7)
sets forth the national bank's authority to exercise incidental powers
which "shall be necessary to carry on this business of banking."'9' In
addition, § 24(7) provides that the national bank should exercise
incidental powers "by its board of directors or duly authorized officers
or agents, subject to law" (hereinafter "the board"). This language
makes clear that the board, not the shareholders, is empowered to
19 7
9
exercise incidental powers ' and to delegate those powers to officers.
Significantly, this provision indicates that incidental powers, as
a part of corporate powers, should be within the board's authority
under the NBA. The NBA generally authorizes the board to manage
the affairs of the national bank. 9 Particularly, the NBA sets forth the
board's powers, such as appointment and dismissal of officers, defining
officers' duties,'9 9 and making bylaws that regulate the conduct of the
general business of the national bank.2°° In addition, as banks are a
form of corporation, the board can exercise corporate powers under
state corporate laws.2"' Therefore, similar to non-banking corporations,
the board can supervise the bank's affairs and adopt sound policies and
19 Dimension, 474 U.S. at 368.
19412 U.S.C. § 24 (2008), "Corporate powers of associations," is made up of eleven clauses
specifying powers of the national bank.
195

12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) provides that:

To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to
law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange,
and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange,
coin, and bullion....
195 Reflecting state corporate law norms that day-to-day operations of business affairs are
delegated to directors. See, e.g., MACEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 266 ("The National Bank Act
tracks language often found in state corporation laws when it provides that the "affairs of each
[national bank] shall be managed" by a board of directors."); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 232 (5th ed. 2000) (explaining that "[t]he traditional language
of business corporation statutes defining the role of the board of directors is that "business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by the board of directors"). Cf § 141(a) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law provides that ordinary bylaws prescribe that the business and affairs of
the corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board, except as otherwise permitted or
provided in the certificate of incorporation.
19 See MACEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 267 (explaining that "although the board has overall
responsibility for managing the affairs of a depository institution, day-to-day decision making will
nearly always be delegated to executive officers"); Merch. Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. 604, 619-2o
(187 I) (cashier's power to certify checks must be authorized through the action of the directors).
19s 12 U.S.C. § 71 ("The affairs of each association shall be managed by not less than five
directors...").
19912 U.S.C. § 24 (Fifth) ("To elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors to
appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties...").
20012 U.S.C. § 24 (Sixth) ("To prescribe, by its board of directors, bylaws not inconsistent
with law, regulating the manner in which its stock shall be transferred,.. its general business
conducted...").
'o'See MACEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 263 (stating that "[b]anks are corporations and
accordingly are subject to many of the principles of corporate law that govern business
associations generally").
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objectives in the areas of loan, investment, assets and liability
2 °2
management, capital planning, personnel policy, etc.
This limitation of the language of incidental powers was
highlighted in Commercial Nat. Bank v. Weinhard.203 In this case, two
shareholders of Commercial National Bank of Portland challenged the
actions of its board in assessing and selling the bank's stocks without
shareholder approval.2 °' The Supreme Court held that assessing and
selling stocks in the absence of the action of shareholders is beyond the
directors' powers because the shareholders, not the directors, have the
right to decide whether national banks must continue or be
liquidated.205 The Court explained that the corporate powers of
directors conferred by 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(6) and 24(7) of the NBA are to
"transact the usual and ordinary business of national banks. 20 6 This
case shows the board can exercise authority pertaining to the usual and
ordinary business of national banks.0 7 To be clear, incidental powers
should be within the granted authority of the board under the NBA.
As discussed in Part III.C.i, the OCC concluded that the
national bank has the incidental authority not only to own and control
operating subsidiaries, but also to deem activities of operating
subsidiaries as those of the national bank by treating the operating
subsidiary as equivalent to the national bank with respect to powers
and status.0 This interpretation, however, raises a question of whether
the bank's board can exercise such incidental powers within its
corporate powers. Specifically, can the bank legally exercise, through its
board, the incidental power to deem the activities of the operating
subsidiary to be those of the parent bank?
To be sure, the national bank has the power to own and control
an operating subsidiary within the board's authority under § 24(7). At
least, the GLBA acknowledged the national bank's authority to own
and control an operating subsidiary whose activities are limited to those
permissible for the national bank. 9 Also, the investment and control of
202

0CC, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORS: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 2-4

(SECTION soi) (Jan. 2998) (In addition, the board must "avoid self-serving practices," "be informed
of the bank's condition and management policies," "maintain reasonable capitalization," and
"observe banking laws, rulings, and regulations"). However, the directors' powers do not include
reorganization transactions, such as merger, consolidation and conversion which are required to be
approved by shareholders. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 214a, 215 and 2 15a.
23 Commercial Nat. Bank v. Weinhard, 192 U.S. 243 (1904).
204 Id. at 243-44.
205
206

Id. at 250-53.
Id. at 248-49 (explaining that

12 U.S.C. §§ 71, 24 (Sixth) and 24(7) of the NBA are the
grounds of the directors' authority to manage the ordinary business of the national banks).
207 Id. at 249-52.

2' Distinguishing the ownership of the national batik from the ability to deem indirect
performance of banking activities is different from the OCC's position that has identified the
ownership of the subsidiary with the power to use an operating subsidiary in conducting banking
business.
'0' See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. E2 3 86-oi (Nov. 15, 1999) (the GLBA "would authorize national
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the operating subsidiary may be exercisable by the board. The board
may decide to own the operating subsidiary,2 1 ° unless such activity
causes a fundamental change in the corporation's structure which
requires approval of the shareholders of the national bank."' In the
parent-subsidiary structure, the national bank can exercise control of
the operations of the subsidiary through its ownership since the parent
bank is, in form, a "shareholder" of the subsidiary. For example, the
national bank may elect the subsidiary's directors, vote on major issues',
amend the articles of incorporation or bylaws, and inspect the
subsidiary's books and records.212 Normally, such control may be
exercisable by the bank's board under almost all state corporation laws
because they would fall within the power to manage the ordinary
business of the bank, with the exception of certain powers reserved to
the shareholders by statute or recognized by the common law.2"3
The national bank, however, does not have the incidental
power, by its board, to deem activities of operating subsidiaries as those
of its parent bank under the NBA. While the parent bank is entitled to
own and control the subsidiary under § 24(7), it cannot influence the
subsidiary's activities directly, but can only use its influence over the
operations of the subsidiary indirectly, by changing the subsidiary's
directors or recommending the subsidiary's operations, etc.214 As a
banks to own or control a subsidiary only if the subsidiary engages solely in bank permissible
activities") (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley). For a detailed discussion of whether the NBA permits
a national bank to acquire or establish operating subsidiaries prior to the GLBA, see Smoot, supra
note 87, at 672-86. This view is consistent with the OCC's position in the 1966 regulation which
only discussed the permission of ownership of operating subsidiaries. See supra notes 113-114 and
accompanying text.
210
211

See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text; see also CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT

B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
137-38 (4th ed. 2003) (shareholders "approve fundamental changes in the corporation's governing

rules or structure").
"' See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (explaining that the parent
corporation's powers as a shareholder include the election of the subsidiary's directors, the making
of by-laws, the determination of capital stock, the inspection of the subsidiary's books and records,
and doing all other incidental acts). It is consistent with the parents' investor status to monitor the
subsidiary's performance, to supervise the subsidiary's financial and capital budget decisions, and
to articulate general policies and procedures. Id. at 72.
213 If a merger or a sale of substantially all of the assets of the subsidiaries constitutes
merging or selling substantially all of the assets of the parent corporation, the vote of the
shareholders of the parent corporation is required. See, e.g., N. J. STAT. ANN § I 4 A: io-i 10),(3);
Hodge v. Cuba Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 340, 348, 6o A.2d 88, 93 (Ch. 1948) (the approval of stockholders
is required if the directors exercise power as to change substantially the capital structure of the
parent company). See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries:The Effect of Corporate
Structure on CorporateControl, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1577, i589-I6O7 (197).

214 See HAMILTON, supra note s96 ("[Tihe shareholders have only limited powers to
participate in management and control: their principle function is to select other persons-the
directors--to manage the business of the corporation for them.") It is the same even when parent
banks can participate in and exert control over the daily decision-making of the operating
subsidiary. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 69-70 (a "well established principle [of corporate law] that
directors and officers holding positions with a parent and its subsidiary can do and do 'change
hats' to represent the two corporations separately, despite their common ownership") (quotation
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shareholder of the operating subsidiary, the parent bank cannot
manage the ordinary business or affairs of "its subsidiaries" because
exercising those activities is entrusted to the "the board" of the
subsidiary generally. 215 The board of the operating subsidiary, rather
than the board of the national bank, has the legal authority to transact
the usual and ordinary business of the subsidiary. The national bank's
power to regard the activities of the subsidiary as the performance of
the parent bank is equivalent to altering the legal characteristics of the
subsidiary's activities. Accordingly, the incidental powers exercised by
the national bank board's corporate powers do not encompass the
authority to grant its subsidiary the same powers and status as the
parent bank or to have its subsidiary exercise incidental powers under §
24(7).
Shareholders

National Bank (Shareholders)

F
2.

Nto l

The Bank Board

Operating Subsidiary.

The Subsidiary Board

I

The "Operating Subsidiary" Cannot Exercise Incidental Powers

The OCC and the Supreme Court in Watters posit that the
"operating subsidiary" can exercise the same incidental powers under §
24(7) as the national bank.216 Citing the VALIC decision, the Supreme
Court held that operating subsidiaries may sell annuities pursuant to
the incidental powers clause because the OCC has treated operating
as equivalent to national banks with respect to powers and
subsidiaries
17
status.'
Such a holding, however, suffers from two problems. First, it is
contrary to the plain language of § 24(7), which refers to "national
banks" as entities having power to exercise incidental powers.
Permitting operating subsidiaries to exercise incidental powers would
lead to the untenable conclusion that a national bank, whose powers
and status are granted by the NBA, may grant the same powers and
status to its operating subsidiary pursuant to its own incidental
omitted).
215 See Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 1603 (explaining that the parent's board has only the

most limited powers within the subsidiary/parent structure and "it is the subsidiary's board, rather
than the parent's, which will have the legal power to set business policy and make significant
business decisions for the enterprise").
216 See supra notes io8-ii2 and accompanying text.
27 Id.
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powers.21 Most cases affirming incidental powers concern "direct
activities that the national bank can exercise" in conducting banking

business. For example, such incidental powers as "paying state taxes on
depositors' accounts" ' or "offering data processing services ' ' "'
presuppose that the national bank could exercise those activities
directly. "2

Second, case law precedent does not support the holding in
Watters. For example, VALIC did not rule on the matter of the legal
treatment of the operating subsidiary, even though the issue there
involved an insurance company's challenge to the OCC's permission to
sell an annuity through the operating subsidiary.2 The Court only
determined whether the national bank's incidental powers include new
activities-selling annuities as an agency based on the OCC's
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 5.34, providing that the operating subsidiary
may conduct the same activities as the national bank. "2In other words,
since the OCC authorized the national bank to use operating
subsidiaries in the late 196os, long before the decision in VALIC in
1995, it does not matter whether the activities are exercised by national
banks or by operating subsidiaries. Likewise, other cases on incidental
powers have only focused on whether a new activity is an incidental
power of the "national bank," not on the legal treatment of the
operating subsidiary. Considering the text of § 24(7) and precedent
cases, the Court in Watters gave great weight to the OCC's
interpretation of precedent cases which were not intended to establish
the legal status of operating subsidiaries.
C. The OCC's Regulatory Authority over OperatingSubsidiaries
Traditionally, the federal government has heavily regulated
banks because of the significant roles they play in the development and
stability of the economy. Banks intermediate money supply in the
financial marketplace and dominate the payment systems for the
settlement of financial transactions. Banks' eligibility for federal
deposit insurance further justifies oversight by bank regulators.
28

This argument is consistent with the dissent's assertion that the incidental power is to

authorize or regulate the conduct of the national bank. See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1582-83 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see also supra notes 172-174.
219 Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120, 140-41 (913).
22 National Retailers Corp. of Arizona v. Valley Nat. Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz.
1976), affd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
2.. For a detailed discussion, see infra notes 250-257 and accompanying text.
222 In VALIC, the Supreme Court mentions "the subsidiary" only once when introducing the
facts of the case. See VALIC, 513 U.S. at 254 ("Petitioner NationsBank of North Carolina,...and its
brokerage subsidiary sought permission from the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to 12
CFR § 5.34 (1994), for the brokerage subsidiary to act as an agent in the sale of annuities.").
123 Id. The Court focused on.whether the sale of annuities as an agent is an incidental power
of national banks. Neither party challenged the OCC's regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 5.34, but, instead,
they assumed it. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (994) in VALIC provided that "a national bank may engage in
activities which are a part of or incidental to the business of banking by means of an operating
subsidiary operating."
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However, does that oversight role extend to a mortgage service
corporation, a state-chartered mortgage lender owned by a national
bank? Can federal regulators.subject a mortgage service corporation to
the same regulatory treatment as the national bank, even though
mortgage lenders do not conduct traditional banking activities?
In Watters, Michigan did not contest the OCC's general
regulatory authority over the operating subsidiary.224 Nor did the
dissent take a clear position on this authority of the OCC.2 The focus
of this part of this paper is on whether Congress authorized the OCC to
exclusively regulate the operating subsidiary. Close scrutiny of
regulatory structure, the incidental powers clause and provisions of the
GLBA shows that the OCC is not granted such broad regulatory
oversight power.
i. The NBA as "Entity Regulation"
Fundamentally, each federal financial regulatory statute is
based on "entity regulation," meaning a certain regulator has regulatory
'
The same is true for the
authority over a certain financial institution."226
NBA, which states that the OCC licenses national banks and regulates
their activities.227 Almost all provisions of the NBA, including charters,
safety and soundness regulations, examination and enforcement, reflect
characteristics of "entity regulation" in order to regulate the "national
bank." Even controversial provisions in this case-§§ 481 and 24a of
the NBA-are understood within the framework of "entity regulation."
The purpose of § 481, providing for the examination of affiliates of the
national bank,225 is to protect the safety and soundness of the national
bank, not its affiliates.2 29 Because affiliates may significantly threaten
the financial condition of the national bank, § 481 allows the OCC to
examine the affairs of all the bank's affiliates but only as shall be
necessary to disclose the relations between the bank and its affiliates
and the effect of such relations upon the bank. 20 The OCC's
224 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1569-70. See also supra notes 88, 1i6 and accompanying text.
22s See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
226 See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United States

Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, I4 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. i, 11-12 (2005) ("U.S.
financial regulation predominately was entity regulation."); BLUEPRINT, supra note 61, at 139
("The current U.S. regulatory system, while often characterized as functional regulation, could
more appropriately be characterized as an institutionally based functional system."). See infra
notes 237-239 for a discussion of functional regulation.
22 See Brown, supra note 226, at 14-15.
228 12 U.S.C. § 48I (prescribing the examination of affiliates).
229 See BLUEPRINT, supra note 61, at 162-63 (describing the regulatory system for
commercial banks as one that is based on the "principle that affiliates should not pose significant
risks to a commercial bank" and further stating that the "ability to examine affiliate relationships"
is one of the safeguards "designed to provide protection from affiliate relationships and limit the
transfer of the safety net"); see also Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 142, at 3 (asserting
that the OCC has no authority to investigate affiliates in their own right, but may do so as an aid
in making its full and detailed report on the condition of the national banks).
20 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 142, at 3.
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examination of affiliates cannot be conceived solely to regulate the
safety and soundness of the affiliates overall.2
Likewise, regulatory schemes for subsidiaries of a national
bank, including financial subsidiaries and operating subsidiaries, also
utilize "entity regulation" to maintain the safety and soundness of the
national bank itself, not of its subsidiaries. To minimize the risk caused
by the activities of subsidiaries, especially financial subsidiaries which
engage in insurance and securities activities, § 24a commands the
"national bank": (i) to meet statutory requirements to control a financial
subsidiary; 232 (ii) to employ safeguards to separate itself from financial
subsidiaries;23 3 and (iii) to divest financial subsidiaries when the bank
fails to comply with the laws. 34 Such strict scrutiny should be excluded
only when a subsidiary does not expose a national bank to higher
risks.235 In sum, these provisions mean that "the national bank" should
control its subsidiaries by adopting appropriate policies and procedures,
not by governing activities of the financial subsidiary or the operating
subsidiary directly. The OCC's authority should be interpreted to
implement this statutory demand of Congress.236
Under this "entity regulation" framework, exceptions to "entity
regulation"--where a regulator other than the OCC exercises
regulatory powers over the national bank, or the OCC regulates entities
other than the national bank-have been set forth with an explicit
congressional intent to do so. For example, when Congress adopted the
concept of "functional regulation" in the GLBA-that is, the same
activities should be regulated by the same regulator, regardless of the
kind of financial institution, 23 7 it clarified the alteration of a primary
regulator. When a national bank or its functionally regulated affiliates
engage in the securities or insurance business, the Securities Exchange
Committee ("SEC") or the state insurance regulators has the
231 Id.
232 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)-(3) (for example, requiring the national bank and each depository

institution affiliate to be well-capitalized and well managed).
233 12 U.S.C. § 24a(d) (requiring the national bank to protect itself from risks of managing
financial subsidiaries and to observe the corporate separateness and limited liability of the national
banks).
234 12 U.S.C. § 24a(e) (requiring the national bank to "divest control of any financial
subsidiary" pursuant to such terms and conditions imposed by the OCC).
235 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A). See also COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 17, at 10-14
("A financial subsidiary does not engage solely in activities in which a national bank may engage
directly.").
236 See 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(5) ("Before the end of the 27o-day period beginning on November
12, 2999, the Comptroller of the Currency shall, by regulation, prescribe procedures to implement
this section."). The OCC construed this clause as allowing its general regulatory authority over
financial subsidiaries: See 12 C.F.R. § 5.3 9 (k) (providing that "[a] financial subsidiary is subject to
examination and supervision by the OCC,subject to the limitations and requirements of section 45
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 183iv) and section 115 of the GLBA (12 U.S.C. §
182oa)").
232 See Brown, supra note 226, at 12, 29 ("Functional regulation focuses on regulating based
on the type of product being provided, instead of on the type of institution providing the
product."); BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 265 (for instance, the securities activities
conducted by national banks would be subject to regulations of the SEC, including the registration
as a broker-dealer).
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responsibility to regulate those activities, respectively.238 If there are no
such provisions, even insurance businesses or securities activities which
2 39
are conducted by the national bank are still regulated by the OCC.
Another instance of "entity regulation" is the regulatory scheme
for a "bank service company" ("BSC"), a corporation which is owned
by a national bank and conducts parts of the banking business like an
operating subsidiary. 4 ° Section 5 of the Bank Service Company Act
squarely indicates the way in which Congress delegates regulatory
authority to the OCC over entities other than national banks by setting
forth a requirement that a BSC is subject to "examination and
supervision" by the appropriate federal banking agency of its principle
investor "to the same extent as its parent national bank. '24 ' The OCC is
explicitly authorized to regulate a BSC by issuing regulations and
orders.242 Similarly, as to the federal branch of foreign banks, a
statutory provision clearly states a branch of a foreign bank "shall be
subject to all the same duties, restrictions, penalties, liabilities,
conditions and limitations that would apply under the National Bank
Act to a national bank. '243 Again, Congress expressly intended that
these entities be subject to the rules, regulations, and orders of the
OCC, and that they receive the same rights and privileges as a national
bank at the same location under the NBA. 44 Given the structure of the
NBA and other banking laws, it is obvious that if Congress had
intended to grant the OCC regulatory power over the operating
subsidiary, it would have expressly done so in the NBA. 45
238

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (repealing "the bank" exception from the definition of "broker"

and "dealer" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); i5 U.S.C. § 671i (insurance activities of a
national bank are functionally regulated by the state insurance regulator); and 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)
(regulations for "functionally regulated subsidiaries," subsidiaries of bank holding companies, such
as securities broker-dealers, investment advisors, future commission merchants, and insurance
companies). See also COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note I17, at 53 (the GLBA "recognizes
the roles of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, and state insurance commissioners as the primary regulators of securities,
commodities, and insurance activities, respectively").
239 The OCC regulates most securities activities, including private investment, asset-backed
securities, derivatives and trust activities, while broker-dealer activities are regulated by the SEC.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 226, at 29.
24 A BSC may perform activities permissible for its shareholders or member banks to
perform directly. 12 U.S.C. § 1863 provides that a BSC may perform services including "check and
deposit sorting and posting, computation and posting of interest and other credits and charges,
preparation and mailing of checks, statements, notices, and similar items, or any other clerical,
bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or similar functions performed for a depository institution."
See also COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 117, at 27.
241 12 U.S.C. § i867(a) (providing that a BSC "shall be subject to examination and regulation
by the appropriate Federal banking agency of its principal investor to the same extent as its
principal investor'). Based on this provision, the preemption principle applicable to parent banks
is applied to the BSC.
242 See 12 U.S.C. § 1867(d) (providing that "the Board and the appropriate Federal banking
agencies are authorized to issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable them to
administer and to carry out the purposes of this chapter and to prevent evasion thereof").
243
22 U.S.C. §
3 1o2(b).
24

Id.

Cf. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress has never
authorized the OCC to "license" the operating subsidiary which is a state-chartered entity).
241
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The Incidental Powers Clause

The OCC construes the incidental power to use operating
subsidiaries as justifying the OCC's regulatory oversight.2 46 However, it
is unlikely that the incidental power indicates or implies the OCC's
authority to regulate the operating subsidiary for two reasons. First,
given the framework of the NBA as "entity regulation," the language of
§ 24(7) is too general and broad to support an interpretation that
Congress' intent was to grant regulatory jurisdiction over a new entity
or to preempt state laws. Congress "does not alter the fundamental
details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
24 7 provisions-it
does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.
Second, because § 24(7) is a rule authorizing or regulating the
24 the OCC's interpretive authority is
conduct of "national banks,""
limited to regulating the conduct of the parent bank in utilizing the
operating subsidiary. The conduct of the operating subsidiary is not
directly under the OCC's authority. Therefore, the conduct of the
national bank subject to the OCC's regulation should include
investment activities in, and supervision of, operating subsidiaries in
order to prevent significant risks to the parent bank. For example, in
Watters, the OCC may prescribe rules to govern Wachovia Bank's
investment in, and supervision or management of Wachovia Mortgage.
This approach is in accordance with limitations on incidental powers,
grounded in the structure of the NBA to oversee the national bank. 49
Case law also endorses this interpretation of incidental powers.
Until Watters, precedent cases only determined whether a "specific
activity of a national bank" was incidental to the "business of banking"
and never granted a far greater authority to "regulate new entities." In
earlier cases, the Supreme Court held that the national bank has
incidental powers "to take corporate stocks in payment and satisfaction
of debts"2 ' and "to own and sell stocks which are acquired as collateral
on a defaulted loan." '' Incidental powers also encompass "paying state
25 3
'
taxes on depositor's accounts, 252 "operating a safe-deposit business
246 See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
247 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking

Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
24 Waiters, 127 S. Ct. at 1583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 See discussion supra Parts IV.B.i., C.I.
250 First Nat. Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122,

228

(1875) ("[Wjhile a bank is

expressly prohibited.. from loaning money upon or purchasing its own stock, special authority is
given for the acceptance of its shares as security for, and in payment of, debts previously
contracted in good faith.").
25 California Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 367 (1897) (holding that a national bank
has an incidental power to take the stock of another corporation as collateral security).
252 Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 220, 140-41 (1913) (holding that paying state
taxes on deposit accounts is incidental to deposit taking because it promotes the convenience of the
bank's business).
'5' Bank of Cal. v. Portland, 69 P.2d 273, 279 (Or. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765 (2937)
(holding that the operation of safe-deposit is within incidental powers of national banks as an
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and "using the word 'saving' or 'savings' in advertising saving
deposits.12 4 In relatively recent cases, specific activities of national
banks such as "selling annuities as an agency, ' 211 "offering data
processing services to retailers '256 and "acting as an agent for the selling
of credit life insurance '257 were judicially established as falling within
the incidental powers of the national banks.
An operating subsidiary's being supervised on a consolidated
basis buttresses the same control of the OCC over the operating
subsidiary.25 8 The Supreme Court held that operating subsidiaries are
consolidated with their parent "for purposes of applying statutory or
regulatory limits, such as lending limits or dividend restrictions" and
"for accounting and regulatory reporting purposes. '259 On the other
hand, the Court stated that the financial subsidiary is not subject to the
same OCC regulations because the OCC does not supervise financial
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.260
Consolidated supervision is, however, irrelevant as a ground for
the general regulatory authority 261 over operating subsidiaries because
combined supervision is basically a supervisory principle to regulate a
banking group, including all the subsidiaries and affiliates of the bank.
This is evident from a report of the Basel Committee -on Banking
Supervision. 262 The report observes that the reason to adopt
consolidated supervision is to regulate all the risks from activities not
only of the bank, but also of its affiliations-subsidiaries and

integral part of the business of banking); see also Colorado Nat. Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 4I
(1940) (explaining that safe-deposit must be considered a banking function).
254 Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954) (holding that a
national bank's using the word 'saving' or 'savings' in advertising is incidental to saving deposits
because advertising is one of the most "usual and useful ways" to engage in authorized deposit
business).
25 VALIC, 513 U.S. at 251.
256 National Retailers Corp. of Arizona v. Valley Nat. Bank, 411 F. Supp, 308 (D.Ariz, 1976),

affd, 604 F.2d 32 ( 9th Cir. 1979).
257 Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449.U.S. 823 (1980) (explaining that credit life insurance is commonplace and
essential to carry on the ordinary consumer credit of the national bank).
25' See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
259 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 157o n.io (stating that the assets and liabilities of both entities are
combined for accounting and reporting purposes, and the lending limits or dividend restrictions of
an operating subsidiary are also consolidated with the parent bank for supervisory purposes)
(quoting COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note i 17, at 64).
260 Id. ("OCC treats financial subsidiaries differently. A national bank may not consolidate
the assets and liabilities of a financial subsidiary with those of the bank.").
261 General regulatory authority includes chartering, safety and soundness regulations,
examinations, enforcements and liquidations.
262 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Core Principles Methodology (October

2oo6), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs13o.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2oo8) [hereinafter
"Core Principles Methodology"]. See also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Core
Principlesfor Effective Banking Supervision (October 2oo6), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsI29.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8). The committee of banking supervisory authority is
composed of representatives of banking regulators and central banks from 13 countries including
the U.S. It was established by the central bank governors of the Gio countries in 1975. See id. at i
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affiliates. 263 As the proliferation of the banking business through the
banking group threatens the safety and soundness of the bank, a
regulator is required to "supervise the banking group on a consolidated
basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential
norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group
' Under this regulatory principle,
worldwide."2 64
consolidated supervision
does not distinguish subsidiaries from affiliates to the extent that it is
appropriate to maintain the safety and soundness of the bank.26"
Consolidated prudential standards-such as capital adequacy, large
exposures, exposures to related parties and lending limits-were
utilized as a supervisory tool to regulate a banking group. 266
Consolidated accounting and financial information reporting also
constitute essential parts of consolidated supervision that are applied to
all relevant entities when appropriate.267 In other words, not only
operating subsidiaries but also financial subsidiaries may be subject to
consolidated supervision, which is different from interpretations of the
OCC and the Supreme Court.
Inconsistent with the Supreme Court and OCC's findings that a
financial subsidiary is not subject to consolidated supervision, the NBA
consolidates the financial subsidiary with the national bank in some
provisions.26 ' The national bank must prepare a consolidated financial
statement which includes the financial subsidiary,269 while the financial
subsidiary is not consolidated for the purpose of calculating regulatory
capital. 270 Also, the figures of all affiliates including operating
subsidiaries and financial subsidiaries are consolidated in calculating
investment limitations in bank premises.2 1 These instances illustrate
that the financial subsidiary is not excluded from consolidated
supervision for specific regulatory purposes, a strong argument against
the idea that only the operating subsidiary should be subjected to the
263 See Core Principles Methodology, supra note 262, at 38 n.43 (explaining that a banking
group includes "the bank and its office, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures'); RONALD
MACDONALD, CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANKS, BANK OF ENGLAND HANDBOOKS IN

CENTRAL BANKING No. 15. 5 (June 1998), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.ukl
education/ccbs/ handbooks/pdf/ccbshbi5.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8) (consolidated supervision
seeks to evaluate the safety and soundness of an entire group by considering the risks of a bank
which are derived from banks or related entities).
264 See Core Principles Methodology, supra note 262, at 38. In this regard, consolidated
supervision maintains the characteristic of "entity regulation" to protect the bank in nature.
.65 See id. at 38 n.43.
266 See id. at 39.
267

Id.

268 The NBA also embodies the concept of consolidated supervision not only for subsidiaries

but also for affiliates of banking (or financial) holding companies-for example, 12 U.S.C. §§
24a(c)(2) (consolidated reporting of financial statements), 16i(c) (reports of affiliates) and 371d(a)
(Investment in bank premises or stock of corporation holding premises).
269 12 U.S.C. § 24a(c)(2) (providing that "...in addition to providing information prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles....). See also MACEY ET AL., supra note
18, at 5o6.
270 12 U.S.C. § 24a(c).
271 12 U.S.C. § 371d(a) (requiring the national bank to include in its aggregate investment in
bank premises any indebtedness incurred by corporations that are affiliates of the bank).
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same OCC regulations under the consolidated supervision rationale. In
addition, the argument of consolidated supervision has another
drawback. The OCC exercised its discretion in applying consolidated
supervision to the operating subsidiaries by selecting or excluding some
provisions without reasonable explanations.
Considering the irrelevance of consolidated supervision and
supporting provisions of the NBA, it is manifest that the OCC's
interpretation is arbitrary and contrary to law-not administrating
a
27 3
demand of Congress, but expressing the will of the OCC.
3. "Same Terms and Conditions" in the GLBA
As discussed earlier, the OCC and the Supreme Court agreed
that the "same terms and conditions" in § 24a(g)(3)(A) of the GLBA
affirmed the OCC's oversight power over the subsidiary as
tantamount to that over its parent bank. 4 However, such a view is not
correct in light of the legislative history and Congress' purpose in
enacting the GLBA, together with the structure of the NBA as "entity
regulation."
Before the enactment of the GLBA in 1999, there had been
contentious debates about whether the operating subsidiary could
engage in a broad scope of activities that its parent bank could not
engage in directly. 5 This issue Was derived from the OCC's amended
regulation in 1996 ("1996 regulation") which permitted operating
subsidiaries to engage in new activities different from those permissible
for national banks.276 For instance, in 1997 the OCC allowed Zions
First National Bank to underwrite municipal revenue bonds through
operating subsidiaries even though Zions was not permitted to
underwrite these bonds directly. 277 Following the language in the 1996
272 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(4)(i) ("when combination is needed to effect the intent of the statute or

regulation, e.g., for purposes of 12 U.S.C. §§ 56, 6o, 84 and 3 71d.'). In the case of other
organizations, such as BSC, Congress authorized the OCC to issue regulations and orders for these
companies "as may be necessary to enable them to administer and to carry out the purposes of this
chapter..." See supra notes 240-242. In the absence of such a provision, the OCC's authority to
select regulations is questionable.
171 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2oo6) (holding that "the existence of a
parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the
regulation but the meaning of the statute"); cf. Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1584 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the OCC's incorporation of "the same terms and conditions" of the GLBA into its
regulation does not support the OCC's position because the GLBA says nothing about
preemption).
274 See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. The dissenting opinion also agreed that
§ 24a(g)(3)(A) may implicate the regulatory power of the OCC over operating subsidiaries together
with state regulations. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
275 See 2996 Regulation, 6i Fed. Reg. at 60,350-52; 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (f) (1997) (providing that
the operating subsidiary can engage in activities which are prohibited to its parent bank);
BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 825. See generally William T. McCuiston, Note, National
Bank OperatingSubsidiaries:How FarHas the OCC Opened the Door to NonBanking Activities?,
2

N.C. BANKING INST. 264 (1998).
276
277

See I996 Regulation, 6i Fed. Reg. at 60,350-52; McCuiston, supra note 275, at 264-66.
See OCC Conditional Approval No. 262, Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on
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regulation, the OCC concluded that selling municipal revenue bonds
was legally permissible as incidental to the business of banking." 8 At
the same time, the OCC reviewed applications by NationsBank, a
national bank, to engage in real estate development, which is another
activity national banks could not conduct directly.2 79 .
In order to justify the 1996 regulation, the OCC created a new

type of operating subsidiary ("1996 operating subsidiary") which it
distinguished from typical operating subsidiaries. The 1996 operating
subsidiary is a subsidiary which: (i) can conduct activities different
from those permissible for national banks; and (ii) is subject to
enhanced supervisory tools of the

OCC.2 8

First, to permit expanded

activities, the OCC changed its policy that the operating subsidiary
could only engage in the same banking business as the national banks
could conduct directly because the subsidiary is, in essence, a
department of a bank. The OCC argued that the description of "a
department of a bank" did not represent "a legal determination that an
operating subsidiary may never permissibly conduct activities different
from those allowed its parent banks. '281 The OCC underestimated the
value of its earlier language referring to the operating subsidiary as a
convenient and useful way for a national bank to conduct banking
business.8 2
Second, the OCC imposed additional supervisory scrutiny for
the new 1996 operating subsidiary. In response to criticism that
allowing new activities would jeopardize the bank's safety and
soundness,283 the OCC emphasized that it could modify its policies
where a change was lawful and enhanced by proper supervisory
tools.2

4

As part of the enhanced oversight, this regulation imposed on

the "1996 operating subsidiary" and its parent bank many additional
conditions and safeguards, such as independent operations from parent
banks and the compliance with safety and soundness regulation. 25" For
example, the application of NationsBank in I997 seeking permission to
the Application by Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah to Commence New Activities
in an Operating Subsidiary (Dec. 1i, I997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/dec97/
ca262.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
278 See id.
271 See Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-07, 62 Fed. Reg. 6,213; see also McCuiston, supra
note 275, at 274-79.
0 See 1996 Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 6o,350-55.
z'

Id. at 6o,352.

282

Id.
Id. at 60,353.

283

284 Id. at 60,352-53 ("The OCC is not precluded from modifying its policies where the
modification is lawful and where enhanced flexibility can be appropriately monitored and
contained via the imposition of conditions as warranted and the availability of improved
supervisory tools.").
285 12 C.F.R. § 5.3 4 (f(2) (i997); 1996 Regulation, 6i Fed. Reg. at 60,353-54. To justify the
1996 operating subsidiary, the OCC imposed "corporate requirements" such as corporate
separateness and distinction, operations under different name, separate accounting and corporate
records and the board of directors. Also, the bank's capital and total assets were reduced by the
amount of the bank's equity investment in the subsidiary. And 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c and 371c-I were
applied to transactions between banks and their subsidiaries. See id.
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28 6
conduct real estate development through operating subsidiaries
included these additional conditions and safeguards. NationsBank
argued that the development of real estate by banks was permissible
because it was incidental to the business of banking, though § 29 of the
NBA restricted the national bank's ownership of real estate. 287
NationsBank asserted that such restrictions would not apply to real
estate development activities through an operating subsidiary because
the risks involved with real estate could be addressed by imposing
conditions and safeguards created under the 1996 regulation, coupled
with self-imposed conditions. 8 Indeed, the OCC's ability to impose
additional terms and conditions was utilized by national banks to
engage in new business, thereby avoiding restrictions on the activities
of the parent bank.
However, the 1996 regulation was confronted by strong
resistance from the Federal Reserve and several members of Congress,
who questioned the OCC's authority to adopt the 1996 regulation as a
means of expanding the scope of national bank subsidiary powers.289
The opponents urged the OCC not to approve its 1996 regulation until
Congress clarified the bounds of permissible activities of the 1966
operating subsidiary and the OCC's authority under § 24(7).290
Finally, Congress repealed the 1996 regulation by enacting the
GLBA.291 Instead of allowing the 1996 operating subsidiary to engage
in extended activities, Congress created a new operating subsidiarythat is, the "financial subsidiary"-which can participate in a broad
scope of securities, commercial, and other activities equivalent to those
of affiliates of financial holding companies.292 The GLBA contained a
number of safeguards similar to those in the 1996 regulation to address
concerns about the safety and soundness of these activities. 29 ' The
difference between them is that a financial subsidiary is conceived and
governed by statute, while the 1996 operating subsidiary is defined and
governed by an OCC regulation.
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
See McCuiston, supra note 275, at 274-75.
288 Id. at 275-79, 288-89 ("NationsBank attempts to address...concern[s] by including a selfimposed limitation on its investment in real estate development activities to two percent of Tier i
capital" and by selling any real estate which it developed as quickly as possible, in addition to the
safeguards in § 5.34(f)).
289 See McCuiston, supra note 275, at 264-65, 276-77; 1996 Regulation, 6i Fed. Reg. at
286

287

60,351-54.
290 See, e.g., 1996 Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,350-5 1.
291 See, e.g., BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 248

("With the creation of financial
subsidiaries in the [GLBA], the expanded authority for national bank operating subsidiaries was
scaled back to the pre-1996 regime.").
292 The financial subsidiary may engage in specific activities that are financial in nature and
in activities that are incidental to financial activities if the bank and the subsidiary meet certain
requirements and comply with stated safeguards. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 25 1
(explaining that activities of a financial subsidiary include activities permissible for subsidiaries of
the financial holding company except insurance underwriting, annuity issuance, merchant
banking, real estate investment and development under 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 a(a)(2)(A)-(B) and
184 3 (k)(7)(B)). See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note i8, at 490-507.
293 See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
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Also, Congress sought to address the OCC's questionable
interpretation that operating subsidiaries may engage in activities not
permissible to national banks on the condition that those activities are
subject to the OCC's discretionary enhanced supervisory tools.
Congress defined operating subsidiary in § 24a(g)(3)(A) and excluded it
from the heavy regulations applicable to financial subsidiaries only if
the subsidiary satisfies two requirements: (i) it can engage solely in
activities that the national bank can conduct directly; and (ii) the same
terms and conditions that govern activities of the national bank are to
be imposed on its activities.
A close examination of the legislative history and purpose of the
GLBA demonstrates that two requirements of § 24a(g)(3)(A) should be
restrictively construed as granting an operating subsidiary immunity
from financial subsidiary regulation, rather than granting the OCC
general regulatory authority over the operating subsidiary. Specifically,
the first requirement codified for the first time the rule that an
operating subsidiary cannot engage in activities that the national bank
could not engage in directly.29 4 The second requirement aims to prohibit
the OCC from imposing additional terms and conditions which are not
applicable to the national banks without statutory grounds. Contrary to
the OCC's interpretation, the "same terms and conditions" should not
be interpreted to mean that the operating subsidiary is subject to the
same OCC regulatory jurisdiction. Rather, it means that operating
subsidiaries can only avoid the financial subsidiary regulations if they
conduct their business subject to the same terms and conditions
applicable to activities of the national bank. The matters of who should
regulate the operating subsidiary in general and whether the state
maintains regulatory powers over the operating subsidiary were left
intact.
This interpretation is supported by the bill passed by the House
of Representatives,295 providing that no provisions should be construed
to allow the national bank's subsidiary to engage in activity that "is not
permissible for a national bank to engage in directly," or "is conducted
under terms or conditions other than those that would govern the
'
This provision was
conduct of such activity by a national bank."296
slightly revised to match the current provision, but Congress has never
altered its intention to prohibit the OCC's arbitrary construction of the
NBA as it did in the 1996 regulation.
294 See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the GLBA "worked a rejection

of the OCC's position that an operating subsidiary could engage in activities that national banks
could not engage in directly").
295 H.R.io, io6th Cong. (section 51 3 6A(a)(i) provides that "no provision of section
5136...shall be construed as authorizing a subsidiary of a national bank to engage in, or own any
share of or any other interest in any company engaged in, any activity that -(A) is not permissible
for a national bank to engage in directly; or (B) is conducted under terms or conditions other than
those that would govern the conduct of such activity by a national bank" unless such ownership or
control is expressly authorized by the federal laws).
296 Id.
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Moreover, similar to the analysis of the incidental powers
clause, 297 "the same terms and conditions" in a definitional context is
not the way in which Congress delegates to the OCC regulatory
authority over other entities. As discussed, Congress clearly expressed
its intent when it conferred regulatory jurisdictions on the OCC.298 The
definitional provision cannot radically change the state's authority over
national bank affiliates that has been in place for more than a
century. 299 Presumably, the OCC recognized its problematic
construction when it inserted the dubious words "the same
authorization" in the regulation 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3), although the
GLBA uses "the same terms and conditions. 3 ° The deviation from the
literal language might reflect the OCC's difficulty in deriving its
regulatory authority directly from the GLBA's definition clause.

V. CONCLUSION

While the concept of incidental powers is flexible and evolving,
its limitations are founded upon the NBA. Approaching the scope of
incidental powers in light of statutory language, regulatory structure
and case law, this article highlighted the idea that the incidental power
in Watters exceeds its bounds and the OCC is not authorized to oversee
subprime mortgage corporations which do not engage in traditional
banking activities. It is quite clear the Congress is aware of the
difference between regulatory structure applicable to depository
institutions and those that govern non-depository companies. This is
evidenced by the regulatory reality over operating subsidiaries. Even
though the OCC has maintained that it retains extensive oversight over
operating subsidiaries, the OCC could not even provide a list of those
operating subsidiaries in 2003. A list containing the names of more than
300 companies was not produced until June 2006.301
This article demonstrates that the OCC's interpretations must
be motivated by its sole aim to expand its regulatory jurisdiction." 2 In
the absence of Congressional intent, the OCC should not be permitted
to construe the NBA so as to cripple the state's oversight function and,
simultaneously, to extend its own regulatory jurisdiction to cover
297 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
29' See discussion supra Part IV.C.i.

"' See supra note 247; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 142, at 9 (arguing that
Congress did not intend to radically change state's authority over national bank affiliates by
adding a definition clause that only acknowledges the existence of operating subsidiaries).
. o See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 142, at ii n.8 (asserting that 12 C.F.R. §
5.34(e)(3) deviates from the NBA because the OCC added the term "authorization",which is not
included in § 24a(g)(3)(A), with no explanation). See also supra note 118and accompanying text.
30' See American Dream, supra note io, at 1369-70.
30' Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1585-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Never before have we endorsed
administrative action whose sole purpose was to preempt state law rather than to implement a
statutory command.').
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operating subsidiaries. Such aggressive constructions, coupled with
judicial deference, may strip each state's important oversight function
of protecting its consumers, as well as the dual banking system in the
U.S. Considering that the recent subprime mortgage turbulence may be
a "necessary consequence" of the OCC's preemption since 2001,
restructuring the OCC's regulatory scheme for operating subsidiaries
can contribute to addressing problems in the subprime mortgage
market.

